

McLaren Independent AIBA Investigation



FINAL STAGE

INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF AIBA

20 June 2022

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Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	I
CHAPTER 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
1.1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.2 REPORT CONTENTS	3
1.3 OVERVIEW OF OUTCOMES OF ALL STAGES	3
1.4 KEY FINDINGS	4
1.5 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE IBA BOARD	5
CHAPTER 2: HIGHLIGHTS OF STAGE 1 AND 3 REPORTS	7
2.1 STAGE 1	7
2.2 STAGE 3	10
CHAPTER 3: THE PRESIDENTIAL SUITE FROM 2006 TO 2020	13
3.1 END OF AN ERA AND START OF ANOTHER	13
3.2 THE PRESIDENT WU YEARS	15
3.2.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW PRESIDENT	15
3.2.2 FALSE ACCUSATIONS AND OBFUSCATING THE FINANCIAL AFFAIRS OF AIBA/WSB/BMA	17
3.3 THE YEARS LEADING UP TO 2014 CONGRESS	19
3.4 THE CONGRESSIONAL DECEPTION OF 2014	20
3.5 UNREST OF THE AIBA STAFF	20
3.6 EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS 2016 MONTREUX, SWITZERLAND	21
3.7 CLOSING THE DOOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL SUITE	22
3.8 INTERREGNUM PRESIDENTS	24
CHAPTER 4: FINANCES	26
4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE BEAUTIFUL DREAM	26
4.2 THE FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS INTO THE WSB AND THE BMA	30
4.2.1 WSB	30
4.2.2 BMA	31
	33
4.3 INVESTMENTS WERE EQUITY, NEAR EQUITY OR LOANS	33
4.3.1 THE BENKONS LOAN	34
4.3.2 SKIFF PROMOTION INVESTMENT	36
4.3.3 FCIT INVESTMENT	37

4.4 CONCLUSION	39
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CHAPTER 5: PROTECT, DETECT AND PREVENT CORRUPTION IN THE FIELD OF PLAY 40

5.1 INTRODUCTION	40
5.2 CORRUPTION ISSUES CONTINUE TO BE IDENTIFIED – BREACHES OF CODE OF CONDUCT/CODE OF ETHICS AND OTHER FOP CONCERNS	42
5.2.1 SIGNALLING	42
5.2.2 UNJUSTIFIABLE SCORING	44
5.2.3 UNJUSTIFIABLE WARNINGS ISSUED BY REFEREES	44
5.2.4 PEER PRESSURE TO MANIPULATE BOUTS.....	44
5.2.5 COMPETITION OFFICIALS ENGAGING WITH THIRD PARTIES AWAY FROM THE TOURNAMENT VENUE”	45
5.2.6 COMPETITION OFFICIALS ENGAGING WITH OFFICIALS AT THE TOURNAMENT VENUE	46
5.2.7 SENIOR OFFICIALS MANIPULATING THE DRAW	47
5.2.8 THE USE OF MOBILE TELEPHONES BY OFFICIALS IN FOP RESTRICTED AREAS	48
5.3 GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE VULNERABILITIES AT TOURNAMENTS	49
5.3.1 THE REQUISITE NUMBER AND CERTIFICATION LEVEL OF OFFICIALS.....	49
5.3.2 LACK OF PROFESSIONALISM AND/OR CONTROL IN FOP	51
5.4 PROTECT – CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT TO SHARE GRIEVANCES WITHOUT REPERCUSSIONS	58
5.5 DETECT	60
5.5.1 THE VETTING PROCESS.....	60
5.5.2 OUTCOMES OF VETTING AND REVIEW PROCESS.....	62
5.6 PREVENT CORRUPTION IN THE FIELD OF PLAY	65
5.7 IMPROVING THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS FOR IBA	67
5.8 CONCLUSION: IS REFORM ACHIEVABLE?	69

CHAPTER 6: THE IBA FAMILY – THE ROLE OF CONFEDERATIONS AND NATIONAL FEDERATIONS 72

6.1 INTRODUCTION	72
6.2 THE CONFEDERATIONS HISTORY	72
6.2.1 LIST OF AIBA CONTINENTAL PRESIDENTS FROM 2006 TO 2022	73
6.3 NATIONAL FEDERATION RELATIONSHIP WITH OFFICIALS.....	77
6.3.1 SURVEY METHODOLOGY	78
6.3.2 DISCUSSION OF SURVEY FINDINGS	78
6.4 RISKS TO THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE	82
6.4.1 FAILURE TO CONDUCT COMPETITIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULES AND STANDARDS	82
6.4.2 SHARING OF INFORMATION	83
6.5 THE SELECTION PROCESS OF OFFICIALS.....	83
6.5.1 IBA R&J SELECTION PROCESS	84
6.5.2 IBA ITO SELECTION PROCESS.....	85
6.5.3 CONFEDERATION R&J SELECTION PROCESS	85
6.5.4 CONFEDERATION ITO SELECTION PROCESS.....	86
6.6 NOTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS	87
6.7 HOW THE CORRUPTION PROCESS COMMENCES AT NF LEVEL	87
6.8 THE CHANGE IN MANIPULATION STRATEGIES	89
6.9 FAILURES IN THE REPORTING PROCESS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION	90

6.10	TRAINING AND EDUCATION VARIATIONS	91
6.11	REQUIREMENT FOR CENTRALISED EDUCATION PROGRAM.....	93
6.12	RISKS FROM LOC FAILURES.....	94
6.13	CONCLUSION	96
CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS.....		98
P A R T I RECOMMENDATIONS PUBLISHED IN STAGE 3 REPORT (10 DEC. 2021)		98
	RECOMMENDATION ONE: INDEPENDENT INTEGRITY UNITY.....	98
	RECOMMENDATION TWO: WHISTLEBLOWER	100
	RECOMMENDATION THREE: INTEGRITY OF AIBA INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	101
	RECOMMENDATION FOUR: EDUCATION	102
	RECOMMENDATION FIVE: DISCIPLINARY PROCESS	103
	RECOMMENDATION SIX: RIGOUROUS ENFORCEMENT OF ROLES OF INDIVIDUALS IN FOP	104
P A R T II RECOMMENDATIONS FROM STAGE 2 REPORT (20 JUNE 2022).....		105
	RECCOMENDATIONS ON IBA REFORMS.....	106
	RECCOMENDATIONS ON THE RIGOUROUS ENFORCEMENT IN FOP	107
	RECCOMENDATION INTEGRITY OF INTERNAL IBA STAKEHOLDERS.....	108

Chapter 1: Executive Summary

1.1 Introduction

Boxing is experiencing a process of self-reform under the scrutiny of the public, the IOC and their membership. Even in the best circumstances, awareness and acceptance of past conduct to achieve self-reform is a difficult and arduous process. In the case of boxing, it is all the more challenging given the fact that the sport must change deeply ingrained learned behaviours within a culture that has not historically respected ethics and integrity.

The public nature of the reform means that each step taken is analysed and judged by those within the organisation and interested external parties. The stakes are high – IOC recognition, continued participation in the Olympics, the fate of athletes around the world and the other members of the boxing family. The IBA's fight for survival is apparent. As a first step, the federation engaged Ulrich Haas and his team (Good Governance Review Committee or "GGRC") to overhaul the governance structure. They engaged McLaren Global Sport Solutions ("MGSS") to look into the past, identify the various learned behaviours and recommend appropriate mechanisms and protocols. This Report together with the previous Stages identifies the past issues that gripped the federation and provides the conceptual framework to move forward. The IBA has begun to implement some of the recommendations but there is much work left to do.

MGSS and its partner company Harod Associates Ltd. ("Harod") (together described in this Report as the McLaren Independent Investigation Team (the "MIIT")) were engaged by the Amateur International Boxing Association (AIBA now known as the IBA)¹ to conduct an enquiry of the sport by Terms of Reference ("TOR") executed on 11 June 2021. The engagement initially involved two

¹ The Report uses the acronym "AIBA" for the actions taken by the organisation up until March 2022. Thereafter, the Report uses the new acronym "IBA."

Stages which later morphed into a third Stage. The key members of the MIIT team included Richard McLaren, Diana Tesic and Robert Copeland from MGSS; and for Harod, Chief Investigator Martin Dubbey, Lead Investigator Alex Miller supported by Tracy Tobler.

In accordance with the TOR, the Stage 1 Report was released 30 September 2021. It detailed the results of the investigation of the bout manipulation that occurred at the Rio Summer Olympic Games. During the course of the Stage 1 enquiry issues arose within the sport which required an amendment to the TOR creating a Stage 3. It was an examination of new allegations of bout manipulation occurring at competitions in 2021. During the course of the Stage 3 enquiry, the MIIT developed a pilot project testing for the risk of potential corruption among Referees and Judges (“R&Js”) and International Technical Officials (“ITOs”). In so doing, the MIIT used a new Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) voice analysis tool. The MIIT has been asked to continue this work in the future.

The immediacy of Stage 3 caused the MIIT to jump ahead and report on Stage 3 on 10 December 2021 before completing the overall tasks of this Stage 2. This final Report now fulfills the TOR.

In Stage 2, the MIIT investigated the past Presidents and made recommendations with respect to the individuals involved in the management, administration and finances of the AIBA during the period from 2006 until 2020. The investigation included determining whether there had been acts of corruption or violations of AIBA policies. The manipulation of sporting results was a focus throughout all stages of the investigation. As a result, this Report contains a lengthy discussion on the extensive problems in the Field of Play (“FOP”). The persons responsible have been identified where possible and recommended for disciplinary action where appropriate for action by the sport.

As the MIIT investigation evolved, the management of the IBA requested further vetting and AI assessments of R&Js and ITOs. The MIIT was present and administered the AI at 5 competitions and completed the vetting at 12 competitions to date in 2022. During the course of Stage 2, the

GGRC was active in implementing the changes to the governance structure of the AIBA. As that work unfolded and the constitution changed, it caused the MIIT to recognise the need to examine the grassroots of the sport – the National Federations and the Continental Confederations. A survey was created and administered. The results of the survey have created a solid foundation for understanding the relationships and their deficiencies between the International Federation and National Federations and their Continental Confederations.

1.2 Report Contents

The highlights of Stages 1 and 3 are briefly discussed in Chapter two. Chapter three entitled Presidential Suite, discusses the management and administration of the presidents from 2006-2020 and the learned behaviours that resulted from their administration. The finances of the organisation is discussed in Chapter four and their contribution to the imperilment of the sport. The issues arising in the FOP are found in Chapter five, which are at the very heart of the learned inappropriate behaviours. The discussion of the grassroots of the sport and the results of the survey of NFs is set out in Chapter six. Finally, in Chapter seven all the recommendations made in the previous stages are set out and identified in the first part of the Chapter. The second part of the Chapter contains the recommendations to the IBA Board developed through the insight, understanding and analysis of the investigation. The last part of Chapter seven contains specific recommendations related to the sport's administration observed during Stage 2.

1.3 Overview of Outcomes of all Stages

The IBA is being thrust into reform as a consequence of the suspension of its IOC recognition as the international federation for boxing. The GGRC and MGSS are the external experts assisting in shaping how the transition could occur. A change in the culture requires the desire of the people capable of leading the change and others agreeing and working to complete the reform. All the rules and regulations and constitution can be made better, perhaps even perfect, but without the right people in the right places the changes will come to naught. The results of the survey conducted by the MIIT of the NFs indicates a strong need to ensure that leaders are equipped

with the requisite leadership skills and understand the foundational importance of ethics and integrity in the management of the sport of boxing. There is a critical need for an educational and development requirement which focuses on changing the incentives so that individuals change their past behaviours. This is crucial to the pathway of the cultural change that is required.

The administration and application of the rules and the conduct of those within the FOP is where the culture of the past has most impacted the sport. Recognising this fact, the MIIT focused on and investigated the operation within the FOP. The MIIT analysed how officials were selected, trained and performed their roles in the bouts. The FOP and the people with their various roles are at the heart of the necessary reform as was sadly demonstrated at the Rio Olympic Games. The MIIT's additional focus was on the onsite vetting and the application of the AI tool in its investigative work which resulted in recommended disciplinary actions.

1.4 Key Findings

1. More than a decade of financial mismanagement created a damaging legacy that hung over the management and administration of the sport until recently.
2. The pursuit of investments for unrealistic business plans and the implementation of the ventures contributed to the improper management and administration of the sport and of the planned ventures.
3. Corruption was allowed to creep in and take hold of the organisation because of the senior management's excessive focus on finding investments for unrealistic ventures. Insufficient attention was paid to the administration of the sport and its officials. When those enterprises never materialised, the sport suffered a huge financial burden that nearly caused its collapse. The singular focus of management became finding funds to repay the loans and pay the staff. The combination of attrition and the lack of financial resources ultimately resulted in the organisation being left with a skeleton staff to run itself.
4. There is a lack of a fully developed IBA set of educational material for R&Js and ITOs to be used by NFs for training sessions at IBA level competitions. The materials that exist are

not delivered by qualified instructors. The training language is English and simultaneous translation is not always available. The consequences are that there is no adequate training and development strategy to ensure advancement of R&Js and ITOs.

5. Overriding the automated draw system by manual interference facilitates the possibility of bout manipulation. The problem is caused by the neutrality principles the sport uses to select R&Js not properly reflected in the automated system, thereby justifying manual draws. Nevertheless, there are far too many manual interventions. This occurs at IBA and Continental Confederation level tournaments.
6. There continue to be reports of officials fulfilling roles that they are not capable of doing despite having credentials suggesting that they could perform the role. The problem is caused by the control of the selection of officials by the Continental Confederations and NFs with a lack of IBA involvement.
7. The Code of Conduct and the rules of the FOP are constantly being breached particularly as they relate to mobile phone use and succumbing to pressure by those who should not be in the FOP. These types of seemingly minor infractions reinforce the past culture which disregarded the ethics and integrity of the sport.
8. Too many people have accreditation to access the FOP without the necessity of being there. Those without accreditation can also be found from time to time in the FOP. Some of these individuals attempt to influence officials or even abuse them.
9. The vetting process and use of the Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) tool together with follow-up vetting has identified potential high-risk R&Js and ITOs who as a consequence have not officiated at the particular tournament. The benefit of the process and presence of the MIIT investigators has been the greater sense of security and protection without interference of external pressures on R&Js and ITOs.

1.5 Key Recommendations to the IBA Board

1. The MIIT investigation Reports identify and describe the pathway to cultural reform of the IBA and its members. The Board ought to commission a cultural review. This review needs to provide a basis for which to alter past inappropriate behavioural attitudes.

2. The Board of Directors to seek funding to establish a Training Academy for the purpose of training senior management and national federation management as well as R&Js and ITOs. That training should include instruction on ethical decision-making, match-fixing and rule compliance for R&Js and ITOs. For senior management, it would involve leadership development and occupational skill development.
3. The IBA should develop comprehensive written training and educational programs for the certification and subsequent progression of R&Js and ITOs. The developed material should be made available and required to be used by all National Federations for the fulfillment of their educational role of R&Js and ITOs.
4. The accreditation process for access to IBA and Confederation level competitions should be removed from the Local Organising Committee and the President's office and be centralised and controlled by the IBA staff.
5. There are a series of recommendations in Chapter seven for the rigorous enforcement of the rules of the FOP and the integrity of IBA internal stakeholders.

Chapter 2: Highlights of Stage 1 and 3 Reports

2.1 Stage 1

The Stage 1 investigation is best understood as two conceptual halves. There is the analysis of the bout manipulation at the Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro (“the Rio Games”) in August of 2016. The other half being the internal power dynamics within AIBA which allowed the corruption to evolve. In order to examine that part of the terms of reference (“ToR”), the background, now under complete review in the current Report on Stage 2, had to be set out. Thus, there is some overlap of the two Reports.

The mechanics of bout manipulation were in use prior to the London Olympic Games and became more sophisticated. The earnest creation of an accreditation system to indicate the R&Js’ experience and ability, known as the star system, removed the power and influence of the National Federations who historically could control their R&Js to manipulate results. However, when AIBA decided to appoint a class of “professional referees” known as the 5 stars, power and influence over the other 3 stars quickly became consolidated in the hands of seven 5 star R&Js. They, with the support and instruction of the Executive Director (“ED”) Karim Bouzidi (“KB”), started pressuring and corrupting other R&Js to manipulate matches. A culture of fear and reprisal had been created along with the 5 stars, who became an autonomous clique only accountable to themselves and the ED.

The Stage 1 Report also revealed the ways in which the subjectivity of judging in boxing could be absolutely abused. How the manipulation by R&Js and some ITO officials at the Rio Games occurred is described in detail in the Stage 1 Report. The contents of these methodologies are set out there and need not be repeated here.

As required by the ToR, considerable time, effort and resources was spent trying to establish which bouts at Rio and some qualifiers were manipulated. It was eventually realised that it was, except in very rare and extraordinary cases, virtually impossible to determine that a bout had

been deliberately manipulated and which officials might be involved. This ultimately led the McLaren Independent Inquiry Team (“the MIIT”) to abandon in Stage 3, or subsequently in Stage 2, attempts to identify whether specific bouts were manipulated. The MIIT concluded that a more valuable use of time and resources would be to focus on safeguarding the Field of Play (“FOP”) and to recommend improvements that would offer better protection for all officials. This concept is discussed in the highlights of Stage 3 following this section.

In Stage 1 the mismanagement of AIBA (now “IBA”) by the President and the first two EDs during his presidency was described. The investigation makes it unambiguous that the best written rules and individuals working to ensure integrity were consistently circumvented by individuals in the organisation bent on personal gain. This system started at the top and rewarded individuals at every level who either had a predisposition for corruption or were manipulated to do so. At the very top, the ED and eventually other key individuals created what the MIIT described as an informal institutionalised structure. While AIBA had on paper a workable organisation, the people involved in the corruption and manipulation created a system that worked to override the checks and balances of the organisation. Through this informal structure, the manipulation and corruption evolved within the sport over the years, with Rio at its climax.

To explain what happened requires an understanding of the management style of the President C.K. Wu (“Wu”). He came into power and led the organisation with questionable leadership skills. He engaged as his ED Ho Kim (“HK”) whom he ultimately dismissed in 2015 and brought in KB as the ED who oversaw events at the Rio Games. He was later dismissed by the President in 2016 following the Rio Games corruption scandal. The President’s main concern during his tenure at AIBA was to ensure an impeccable public perception of his actions and that nothing done by AIBA would impact his public image because he had aspirations to be the President of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”).

The EDs in this first stage were not innocent bystanders of the President’s failed leadership. Indeed, ED KB was the lynchpin of the collapse at Rio. It was perhaps the most publicly obvious

manifestation of KB's influence over the informal structure. The erosion of the constitutional structure which laid the foundation of the system of manipulation and the concentration of power in the ED was set years before and included the President's first ED, HK . KB capitalised on what had been executed before him, which allowed him to usurp the powers of the AIBA's internal commissions to that of his own office; namely the commissions responsible for R&Js and Technical Rules and that of the Draw Commission at the Rio Games.

Although he remained ultimately responsible for the failures of officiating at Rio and the qualifying events, as determined by the MIIT, Wu's actions throughout his Presidency to protect his image allowed him to cut his losses at the ED level and place the blame for any failings of the organisation at the feet of others.

The AIBA Commissions were meant to be a check and balance on the system, but in practice the rules were circumvented. The consequence was that decision-making power became more and more concentrated in the office of the ED. Nevertheless, the Commissions' members stood by and let this happen as did the President. Behind both EDs the ultimate controller of events was the President who meddled in all matters but took no responsibility for the execution of the administration of the sport, always leaving it open to blame the EDs or others.

The eventual result of all these power dynamics at play within the IBA was that the organisation began trading within its membership using a currency of "favours". The Stage 1 Report describes a culture of favours among the former soviet countries in attempting to achieve sporting prowess by obtaining medals at world championships and Olympic Games and the accompanying qualifying events. These favours translated into manipulation of bouts to further political prestige and enhance national sporting prowess. To accommodate the process there was manoeuvring of the selection of R&Js to attend competitions and officiate specific bouts as they were key to the success of the manipulation process.

Olympic qualifier and Continental competitions in the lead up to Rio were the training ground for the corruption and match manipulation that would later occur at the Games. The corrupted R&Js fine-tuned and adapted their techniques throughout the period leading up to Rio which eventually resulted in the use of methodologies that the MIIT uncovered during their investigation into corruption at the Games.

The President was dismissed by an internal insurrection in 2017. The effect of these actions was to trigger a backlash by members of the Executive Board that led to a series of interregnum Presidents and EDs. The overall impact was the creation of a destabilised organisation until the arrival of the current President in 2020 as discussed in the Stage 3 highlights below.

2.2 Stage 3

The focus of Stage 3 was the period following the Rio Games. Rio had concluded with the suspension of the R&Js and ITOs present at the Games and the subsequent dismissal of the ED. The actions taken at Rio regarding manipulation and corruption should have heralded a fresh start for the organisation. It did not. Instead, the same problems kept manifesting themselves. The manipulation and corruption survived the drastic actions taken both at the Rio Games and subsequently.

The hopscotch over Stage 2 and on to Stage 3 comes as a result of press releases concerning continuing bout manipulation at the ASBC Asian Elite Boxing Championships in Dubai in the spring of 2021. This and other events triggered an amendment to the ToR seeking an examination of AIBA level competitions between 2016 and the end of 2021. It became exceedingly important for the organisation to understand what happened post Rio. The investigation required analysing what was actually happening in the FOP as it related to corruption. Therefore Stage 3 looked at (i) legacy actors who continued to have an influential role outside of the formal positions and post Rio, what the MIIT termed the “interregnum period,” (ii) the disciplinary process during that period and finally, (iii) a real time pilot project that was launched during the Belgrade World Championships aimed at curbing corruption and bout manipulation.

The Stage 3 Report delves into the history of KB and how he became the organisation's second in command. One of the MIIT's witnesses put it this way: *"a newspaper salesman became the owner of the newspaper"*. When he accepted the ED role, KB failed to advise on his relationships with Executive Committee ("EC") members and failed to divulge his business interests with a sponsor. He then leveraged those relationships to an extent that they provided clear conflicts of interest. He was equally active subsequent to his dismissal in the interregnum period trying to influence the organisation despite no longer being part of the organisation.

In the interregnum period following the dismissal of President Wu the organisation staggered through a revolving door of Presidents and EDs. The frequent changes caused instability and a lack of cohesive leadership from the top down. The organisation was suffering from the inactions and concealment tactics of its former President and the headache of the mismanagement and neglected finances that overhung the very existence of AIBA. This overhanging legacy of the past eventually caused the IOC to suspend the membership of AIBA in 2019 and to step in and manage the sport's qualifiers and the competitions at the Summer Olympics of 2020 held in 2021 because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Thus, the examination of the interregnum period was undertaken with a focus on corruption and why the environment did not change in the post Rio era. Part of the answer was found in the fact that individuals like the two dismissed EDs and others banished from their AIBA positions still maintained considerable influence over the AIBA Executive and its oversight role in the boxing world. They were at this point operating from behind the curtain and not as members or staff of AIBA.

During the period of the Stage 3 investigation a new pilot project was introduced by the MIIT. It involved the use of Artificial Intelligence ("AI") to better understand what was actually happening in the FOP. It did so by identifying those in the R&J and ITO officiating pools at the Men's World Championships in Belgrade, Serbia in October 2021 who might be a risk to the integrity of the

competition. The positive effects of this pilot project on the R&Js led to further use of the AI in six other competitions including the 2022 Women's World Championships in Istanbul, Turkey.

The disciplinary process of AIBA also was evaluated by the MIIT. In doing so we gained an appreciation of the ineffective institutional response to complaints of corruption. The complaints were mishandled or dismissed without proper examination and evaluation. Members of AIBA were beginning to come forward and speak with the MIIT on a confidential basis. From our investigative work and the courage of those who did come forward we were able to identify a number of problem areas that required attention.

The Stage 3 Report closes with Recommendations for Action. The Recommendations centre on six topic areas: an Independent Integrity Unit; Whistleblower Policy; Integrity of Internal Stakeholders; Education; the Disciplinary Process and Enforcement of Roles of Individuals in the FOP. This final topic of our recommendations brought us to the primary focus of Stage 2: that the FOP policies and protocols had to be overhauled and rigorously enforced.

Chapter 3: The Presidential Suite from 2006 to 2020

3.1 End of an Era and Start of Another

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic was the site of the AIBA Quadrennial Congress in November 2006. It was during this Congress that the presidency of one of the longest running International Federation Presidents came to an end. Anwar Chowdhry (“Chowdhry”) was up for re-election as the President of AIBA, a position he held since 1986. Opposing him was C.K. Wu (“Wu”) a member of the AIBA Executive Committee (“EC”) since 1982 and an IOC member since 1988. Wu ultimately displaced Chowdhry, however his election was not without drama. In the 2006 election it appears that both candidates used cash bribes to obtain National Federation (“NF”) votes.

The Chowdhry campaign was supported by Green Hill Corp. (PVT) (“Green Hill”) with its operations in Pakistan and at the time one of five licensee suppliers for AIBA. Throughout Chowdhry’s tenure, Green Hill had a practice of offering boxing equipment free-of-charge to AIBA National Member Federations on behalf of AIBA. Accordingly, the distribution of equipment gratis to NFs appears to have corresponded with congressional and presidential elections. The 2006 elections were no exception.

Green Hill sent an email on 18 October 2006 to all AIBA National Boxing Federations (“NFs”) with the subject matter described as “Gift from AIBA”. The supplier and sponsor of AIBA appeared to be supporting the re-election of the incumbent President Chowdhry. With Wu at the helm, a series of personnel and partnership changes were undertaken, leaving a raft of disgruntled AIBA stakeholders, one of which was Green Hill. Shortly following the election, Green Hill sent an invoice to the AIBA Headquarters, claiming 75,500 USD for boxing equipment sent to AIBA NFs, along with spurious shipping costs. The suspicion at the time was that Green Hill had sent this boxing equipment by the order of Chowdhry perhaps as a bribery attempt to AIBA NFs for their vote in the election. As a result, the new AIBA leadership requested that Price Waterhouse

Cooper (“PWC”) investigate the former AIBA and Green Hill relationship. Their investigation report was provided to the AIBA Ethics Commission chaired by François Carrard and concluded that the business relations between AIBA and Green Hill in the past years showed irregularities in the accounts. Therefore, following the recommendations from the AIBA Ethics Commission, the AIBA EC unanimously decided that AIBA should cease business with Green Hill.

As outlined in the Stage 3 Report the newly elected President and his Executive Director (“ED”) Mr. Ho Kim (“HK”) kept Green Hill and their attempts to influence the organisation at bay throughout the period of the tenure of the ED. When the ED was forced to resign in 2015 his replacement Karim Bouzidi (“KB”) immediately revived the former relationship of Green Hill that had existed under the Chowdhry presidency. In Stage 3 the MIIT outlined the relationship that KB had with a company called Green Hill France-Afrique and their operation selling Green Hill products in Africa. The MIIT was not able to conclude the exact nature of the relationship between Green Hill Corp (PVT) and Green Hill France- Afrique.

Wu allegedly made a deal with AIBA Vice President Gafur Rakhimov² (“GR or Rakhimov”) who was later to serve briefly as President in the interregnum period (2017-2020). The alleged deal was that Wu would resign after 2 terms, taking him to 2014, thereby enabling GR to run for the Presidency. Wu, for reasons outlined in this chapter did not act in accordance with the deal. Wu held onto the Presidency until his resignation in November 2017. What follows his resignation was described by the MIIT as the “interregnum period” until the current President Umar Kremlev was elected in November 2020. In Stage 3 of this investigation the MIIT described this period and how certain individuals came to hold the two highest offices within the organisation, the President and the ED. This chapter looks at President Wu’s tenure as President and how his actions placed the organisation in a precarious position. The interregnum Presidents inherited the “catastrophic state” of the organisation. Following the election of President Kremlev the precarious legacy of Wu has been put to the past. All the past Presidents but for one declined to meet with or answer questions posed by the MIIT.

² There are two potential spelling of his name in English “Rahimov” or “Rakhimov”.

3.2 The President Wu Years

From the outset of the Wu presidency he acted as a micro-manager of all details and minutiae of the organisation and used an autocratic management style in his decision making. He in effect meddled in all matters of AIBA but took no responsibility for any actions; and in particular the administrative actions of the sport. Blame was always placed on others, never at his own doorstep. The MIIT discussed in Stage 1 his modus operandi of ensuring there were always people he could dismiss or force to resign if he did not like the outcomes of the organisation's actions, which he had instigated. The most glaring example of this is the treatment of HK as discussed in Stage 1. Wu acted in this fashion to protect his personal image. His public image was critical to mounting a successful bid for the IOC presidency, Wu's ultimate goal. Ensuring that his AIBA platform remained untarnished was necessary, as it was the launching pad for his bid for the IOC presidency. It is against this backdrop that the decisions taken during this time at the helm of AIBA are filtered. The following is a brief description of the reasons Wu made the financial decisions he did. The general financial state of the organisation, as it relates to this period and beyond, are more thoroughly discussed in the following Chapter 4.

3.2.1 The Objectives of the New President

There were two key expansive business ideas that emerged in the early years of the Wu presidency, these being the World Series of Boxing ("WSB") and the Boxing Marketing Arm ("BMA"). Both ideas were conceived by the ED and championed by Wu. There was also the APB, the AIBA Professional Boxing program. To develop these programs investment was required.

In May 2009 the WSB was incorporated to be a vehicle through which franchises would be issued worldwide, including the USA, for a semi-professional league style of competition. To accomplish the objective, AIBA entered into a partnership with International Marketing Group ("IMG") who, for 25% of WSB shares, was to undertake the marketing promotion and find franchisees worldwide. While AIBA itself had found some franchisees of its own, IMG had failed to secure any success in this area, especially in the lucrative USA franchise markets. On that basis, after

only one year, they decided to end their relationship with AIBA; one explanation being that the project was considered not financially viable. AIBA bought back the IMG shares and inherited the task of finding franchises in the USA and elsewhere. It had already secured franchises in other cities outside of the USA. AIBA decided that for the WSB to be a success, four USA franchises were necessary. AIBA decided to incorporate another vehicle known as WSB American Operations (“AO”), which would hold four AIBA incorporated and funded franchises. Wu had caused AIBA to unwittingly become a multiple franchise owner and with it, had inherited all the associated risks and liabilities.

By 2010 Wu and HK had to find investors and franchises in order to manage the launch of WSB and support the already established American franchises. The financing proved easier to obtain than the franchises. Wu and HK managed to secure a 10 Million USD loan from an Azerbaijan based company, Benkons LLC (“Benkons”).

The Benkons agreement was to support the operation of the WSB American franchises. The agreement was finalised in Baku, Azerbaijan in November 2010 in the presence of Wu and HK, both of whom signed the agreement. A copy of the loan agreement was kept in a locked safe in HK’s Lausanne office until it was discovered following his dismissal in late 2015. At that time the safe was unlocked and the document was examined. Only then did the true nature of its contents become known. The agreement was in fact a loan from a de facto government body to WSB, with AIBA acting as guarantor. From the outset, Wu and HK had purposely kept its precise contents hidden. Had the terms been known, it is unlikely that the EC would have approved AIBA to guarantee the WSB loan. This would have meant that should Benkons have requested repayment, AIBA would have had to use their budget to cover it, this being derived primarily from payments received from the IOC. Covering such a large debt with limited funds would have left AIBA unable to fund its office or other events such as World Championships or Olympic qualifiers. It also would have created chaos for Wu’s objectives for WSB. So it was kept a secret. Wu misled the 2014 Congress as to the overall financial state of affairs and hid the true nature of the Benkons agreement. Such deception was characteristic of the Wu presidency.

Two years after the Benkons loan, in late 2012, the BMA was incorporated with the objective of carrying out the marketing and promotional activities for the WSB and APB. For this, Wu and HK sought an investment from Skiff Promotion LLP (“Skiff”), a Kazakh company and affiliated marketing arm of the Kazakh Boxing Federation. The Skiff investment was entered into by the acquisition of 25% of the shares of the newly incorporated company. By this point the WSB had burned through the 10 Million USD from Benkons, and Wu was desperate for the WSB to succeed. This new move was undertaken out of necessity to obtain more investment money for AIBA in order to shore up the weak and failing WSB venture.

3.2.2 False Accusations and Obfuscating the Financial Affairs of AIBA/WSB/BMA

Following the signing of the Benkons agreement in late 2010, the seeds of some of the bout manipulation described in the Stage 1 Report were planted by Wu. The method of doing so was suggestive and not overt. For example, Wu stated to HK that going forward “*we need to make sure AZE boxers do not fall victim to a bad decision and protect them from misjudgment*”. That communication was understood to be a request for special attention to be paid to the performance results of AZE boxers in competitions.

During the AIBA World Boxing Championships held in Baku in 2011, the BBC Newsnight program ran a story accusing AIBA of money for medals, through an interview with the WSB CEO Ivan Khodabakhsh. It was alleged that two gold medals were promised to Azerbaijan at the 2012 London Games in exchange for money. After the BBC accused AIBA, the mindset of Wu toward Azerbaijan changed from protecting Azeri boxers from bad decisions to protecting himself from any misperceptions.

Wu reacted to the BBC story at the London 2012 Games. He made a speech during an R&J meeting prior to the start of the Games. The BBC accusations were raised. The thrust of the comments were that any sponsorship and investment in AIBA should not mean Azerbaijan is guaranteed to get gold medals. Once again the communication was left to be interpreted by the recipient. Some R&Js apparently thought that what the President desired was to make sure that

Azeri boxers did not win any gold medals. The apparent problem from the President's perspective was that if an Azeri won a gold medal there was risk of worldwide scandal raised by the media accusing AIBA of making a deal of medals for money. This could further reinforce the false BBC broadcast of 2011, later alleged to have been a frame-up of the WSB CEO.

After London 2012 the need to find investment funds for the WSB had become an urgent matter. The league had essentially no marketing and promotion, practically no audience and whatever revenue was coming into the WSB was swiftly denuded by AIBA as a management fee. The WSB may have had a chance if AIBA itself was not so aggressively taking money out of the operations through its management services agreement. This was an important part of the deception, however, to show the Board the false revenues coming out of the WSB.

The BMA was devised as a means to promote worldwide the WSB and APB. But, it too needed investment capital to start its operations. Skiff was approached. It was a Kazakhstan marketing and investment company owned by the Kazakh Boxing Federation and funded by the Kazakh government. A deal was struck that would have Skiff make an initial 10 Million USD investment for 20% of the shares of the BMA. With the investment came a position on the board of Directors of the BMA. The agreement was never reviewed or approved by the AIBA EC. The plan included significant management service fees to be paid by the BMA to AIBA; a move that would improve the organisation's cash flow.

The business plan of the BMA was developed by the ED with the assistance of PWC. The plan was extremely complicated and contained illusory and fanciful projections of marketing sales with highly exaggerated projections. The payments to the BMA found their way to AIBA accounts via management and other charges. The financial details were hidden from the EC, as was done with the Benkons agreement. When presented to the 2014 Congress, the financial picture showed artificially inflated revenue projections.

3.3 The Years Leading up to 2014 Congress

As a result of the BBC broadcast, the IOC requested that an investigation be conducted into the false claims. AIBA convened a Special Investigation Committee (“SIC”), chaired by Tom Virgets. The SIC examined the Benkons transaction and reported to Wu. This report was then delivered to the IOC. The first Benkons transaction was signed by Benkons Switzerland and, at the request of the Azerbaijanis, was rescinded and the agreement signed by Benkons Azerbaijan. Wu provided the SIC with the rescinded Swiss agreement instead of the agreement with which it was replaced. Thereby the SIC was misled, who in turn inadvertently misled the IOC as to the body with whom AIBA had contracted. It appears that the SIC was intentionally deceived because of optics – the IOC would perceive it more legitimate if AIBA contracted with a Swiss company rather than an Azeri company.

HK was the ED of AIBA but was appointed by Wu to be the person in charge of the WSB and the BMA. The workload was intense and HK eventually had to step away in order to focus on his AIBA duties. In November 2013 HK hired a Finance Director (“FD”) acting for AIBA, the WSB and the BMA. The first year the Director was primarily focused on revising the BMA business plan and financials in order to acquire a potential additional investment of 35 Million CHF.

In November of 2013 Benkons exercised its contractual right to repayment by WSB who, due to their poor financial situation, defaulted on the payment. That triggered the guarantee of the loan by AIBA, who as of that date was liable for the repayment. This important fact was not revealed to the EC or mentioned in the 2014 Congress presentation of the finances of AIBA; a further example of the deliberate oversight and misrepresentation of the financial affairs of the organisation. The loan default was finally recognized and paid off under the Presidency of Kremlev.

During much of 2013 Wu was preparing his candidacy for the IOC presidency. The presidential campaign proved to be a significant distraction from the duties of their positions with AIBA for both the President and the ED. A report commissioned by AIBA to look into the finances of WSB

following Wu's resignation indicated that the unsuccessful campaign incurred expenses which were paid by AIBA and Wu himself also utilised AIBA resources such as staff.³ This illustrates the importance that Wu placed upon the preservation and maintenance of a good personal image to use as a launching platform from ABIA for candidacy. This was also a total abuse of AIBA funds.

3.4 The Congressional Deception of 2014

The next Congress of AIBA was held in Jeju, Korea in November 2014 where earlier plans were that Wu was supposed to have ceded the Presidency to Gafur Rakhimov ("GR"). Instead re-election was sought. Wu needed to project a positive and bright future for the sport. The chosen path was to mislead the AIBA EC and the Congress in respect of the financial position of the association. The deception was accomplished by manipulation of the financial presentations and issuing inaccurate and deliberately misleading press releases. The manipulation involved both ignoring and removing debt payable by AIBA or its subsidiaries and masking amounts paid by AIBA in respect of the presidential office expenses.⁴ Neither the EC or members of the Congress had seen the agreements nor had the audited financial statements of the previous years following the prior Congress been presented at Jeju. The information that was presented was inaccurate. For example, it did not report the 10 Million USD loan from Azerbaijan. This moved AIBA from being in the black financially to significantly in the red; a further significant example revealing the strategy of not reporting information and obfuscating the details that were presented. The constitution at the time required the filing of audited financial statements.

3.5 Unrest of the AIBA Staff

In June of 2015 HK was dismissed. The staff rallied to protest HK in his role as ED. Later staff unrest resurfaced surrounding the resignation of Wu, after which the office shrank to a single person by 2019 due to Wu's corrupt financial legacy.

³ Information taken from K2 Report (Project Cambria) Executive summary page 9 (13 July 2018).

⁴ Information taken from K2Report (Project Cambria) Executive summary page 7 & 8 (13 July 2018).

Contributing to the staff unrest was the fashion in which they were hired and eventually dismissed from the organisation. When individuals hired to either the WSB or the BMA showed any promise they were quickly made AIBA employees. Once within AIBA, if they disagreed or disapproved of any decision taken by Wu they were thusly dismissed. This is essentially what occurred with the ED KB having come from the WSB and into AIBA. Once he was dismissed by Wu, he remained in the background encouraging the staff to rally against the President.

3.6 Extraordinary Congress 2016 Montreux, Switzerland

Following the competition fiasco at Rio an Extraordinary Congress was called in December 2016. Prior to the Extraordinary Congress in Montreux, HK, by then in conflict with AIBA, sent a letter to the AIBA NFs to respond to false allegations made against him and to reveal his side of the story regarding his dismissal. In so doing he described the financial situation in which AIBA was at that time. Attendees at the Extraordinary Congress had historical information provided by HK through the letter and current information provided by the FD, but unbeknownst to them he was restricted by the President in what he could reveal.

The FD was requested to present to the AIBA EC an update on the financial situation, while at the same time, not revealing the full details. Essentially his comments were to reflect a “work in progress” financial report for AIBA as of 30 November 2016 together with other financial information and the strategic plan for the coming four years. Following the presentation, the FD emailed the ED (William Louis-Marie) to advise that the Profit and Loss statement did not reflect the impact of the loan from Azerbaijan which was by then a liability of AIBA. The FD was worried that he had given misleading information to the EC.

When asked by the President to present the financial information to the Congress, the FD refused. Wu indicated he would ask the ED to do the presentation. This did not happen. The FD was called upon to present the financial update and, as ordered, provided the misleading information. He subsequently shared the situation with the EC who in return indicated to the

President that the matter had come to their attention. The FD was called to meet with the President to answer questions about what he had been saying to other members of the staff regarding AIBA's financial situation. This entire state of affairs culminated in the FD resigning from his position. The MIIT's review of the FD's present work indicates a careful administration of financial matters.

3.7 Closing the Door to the Presidential Suite

During this time, GR, AIBA Vice President, contacted HK (no longer a part of AIBA) to see if he would agree to help him remove Wu. Approximately two months prior to the Santo Domingo Congress it is alleged that GR had made a deal with Wu who promised him he would resign after two terms. Wu did not keep his promise mainly due to the fact that he was not successful in his IOC election campaign. GR, feeling betrayed, wanted to devise a plan with the help of HK to remove Wu.

HK met GR in March 2017 in Dubai and agreed to assist him in implementing a way to force Wu to resign. HK agreed to go public on all of Wu's wrongdoings and would seek support from boxing stakeholders worldwide. To HK's surprise he found out KB was part of the team working to displace Wu. GR agreed to pay for all logistical costs involved.

In July 2017 at the meeting of the EC in Moscow a motion of no confidence in President Wu was tabled and called for an Extraordinary Congress. Eighty-one Member Federations sent letters in support of this motion. A further noteworthy motion was to form an Interim Management Committee ("IMC") and for the AIBA EC IMC to take over the administration and management of the AIBA Headquarters for an interim period as well as to take over Wu's duties and responsibilities under the AIBA Statutes.⁵

⁵ composed of Franco Falcinelli who was appointed as Chairman (thus signing letters), Pat Fiacco, Terry Smith, Mohamed Moustahsane and Alberto Puig De La Barca—later joined by Ted Tanner.

In a follow up to this meeting, on 25 September 2017 an informal meeting referred to as a hearing on AIBA finances was held in Albena, Bulgaria. The purpose was to receive information directly from the sources of the investments and loan amounts and the previous financial directors. Invited to that meeting were representatives from Benkons, Skiff and First Commitment International Trade Company ("FCIT"), both former EDs HK and KB and the former FDs, who had by that time resigned.

The myth espoused by Wu to this day that the Benkons loan was a personal loan organised solely by HK was exposed and discredited at the special meeting by the direct testimony of the Benkons managing Director, Elin Zalov. He confirmed that the signed agreement, of which he had a copy, was a loan to WSB guaranteed by AIBA and signed by both Wu and HK on behalf of both AIBA and WSB.

The circumstances of the creation of the Skiff loan and the FCIT loans was also discussed at the meeting. The management style of Wu and his EDs can be identified in a review of the minutes of this extraordinary meeting; mainly that he was highly controlling, especially of finances. Every single expenditure would require his sign off, no matter where in the world he happened to be.

What this information reveals is that Wu had full visibility of the financial health of the organisation and that being the case, he knew the projects were out of money with virtually no prospect of them being self-funding. That simple fact was concealed and obfuscated by Wu at the 2014 Congress where the EC and the Congress were misled as to the poor financial health of the WSB, the BMA and the APB, all of which would ultimately have a detrimental impact on AIBA. This financial problem is the backdrop to all the matters that went on from 2014 through to 2019.

Following Wu's resignation, Franco Falcinelli became the Interim President, and this marked the beginning of the interregnum period.

3.8 Interregnum Presidents

Franco Falcinelli's presidency was short lived. He had inherited a Federation on the brink of collapse and with little perspective for the future. The tasks before him were daunting and he described to the MIIT that he didn't have the abilities to deal with the problems which he summed up as "*a catastrophic state of affairs*". AIBA had limited cash, the Board had just learned the full details through the Albena hearings of the skeletons Wu had put in the closet and the IOC was demanding immediate and positive change otherwise their Federation was at risk of losing their IOC recognition as the IF for boxing. Falcinelli knew the situation was grim and he was overwhelmed at the prospect of having to fix the mistakes from the past. His major contributions to the Federation during his tenure were maintaining communication with the IOC and hiring K2 Intelligence to perform a post-mortem on the finances of the WSB.

Falcinelli initially was a supporter of GR to become the next President and even supported him in his failed attempt to displace Wu at the 2014 Congress. However, information came to light that caused Falcinelli to switch camps and he began supporting an EC member from Kazakhstan. He announced his resignation during the Extraordinary Congress held on 27 January 2018 in Dubai.

At the Extraordinary Congress on 31 January 2018 GR was made Interim President. The IOC raised concerns about Rakhimov's suitability for the role of President which the MIIT outlined in the Stage 3 Report. Despite the IOC's concerns related to him becoming President, on 2 November 2018 he was elected. Rakhimov nonetheless made several attempts to salvage the operation of the Federation whose staff was decreasing by individuals leaving or being dismissed. The parade of horrors that awaited GR included a showering of lawsuits launched against the organisation for improper dismissal or payment of wages owed by previous staff; the IOC informed the organisation that it was revoking its recognition of AIBA as the International Federation for boxing; and Benkons was seeking payment on its loan it had called in 2013 and was threatening legal action. It is as a result of Rakhimov's negotiations with Benkons, that 2 Million EUR was termed as a sponsorship contribution reducing the outstanding balance from 10 to 8 Million.

Rakhimov himself had once promised to be able to provide the capital to cover the debt, but that proved fruitless.

The close of the 2018 WSB season was the most critical period during Rakhimov's tenure however, as there were no funds to organise the finals. In what appears to be a desperate attempt to keep the WSB afloat and to potentially secure the initially contracted amount for investment into AIBA, Rakhimov entered into new negotiations with FCIT, despite its legal threats against AIBA to collect on 19 Million of its total USD investments. A new share purchase agreement was drawn up, along with further licencing agreements. However, none of his attempts to renegotiate the terms of the agreement ever came to fruition.

Following concerns about Rakhimov's background, he was subsequently replaced by another Interim President, Mohammed Moustahsane, in July 2019.⁶ He was the only VP willing to take on the interim role which he was appointed to at the Dubai meeting. The Presidency of Moustahsane was primarily focused on a holding pattern to keep AIBA operating as the IF. He was described to the MIIT as a puppet Interim President. The organisation at this point lacked capacity to operate effectively and people to carry out its operations.

The rapid turnover of Presidents and EDs had paralysed the organisation. It was exceedingly difficult for AIBA to fulfill its obligations as an IF. The problems of Rio, the absence of progress in dealing with the bout manipulation by R&Js and ITOs, the lack of proper governance of the organisation, particularly during the interregnum period, and the catastrophic state of the finances led the IOC to step in. It suspended the recognition of AIBA as the IF for boxing and it created the Boxing Task Force, essentially acting as the de facto administrator to protect the athletes preparing for the Tokyo 2020 Games. The interregnum period came to an end with the election of President Kremlev in December 2020.

⁶ No interview could be arranged with Rakhimov and Moustahsane declined to be interviewed about his role as President.

Chapter 4: Finances

4.1 Introduction: The Beautiful Dream

The financial health of AIBA has been the source of much speculation, investigation, and intervention. Historical details corresponding to other types of financial mismanagement have not been examined by the MIIT because they do little to explain IBA's situation today. The issues facing IBA today derive for the most part as a result of the expansive dreams that President C.K. Wu ("Wu") had about the organisation when he became President of AIBA in 2006. This dream changed the scope of AIBA from its original objective of governing amateur boxing to growing their influence and governance over all forms of boxing at all levels worldwide. Based on this dream, and the money needed to finance it, he made the financial decisions that brought the organisation to a state of near insolvency by the time of his departure in 2017. Upon taking over as temporary President in 2017 from Wu the then incumbent Franco Falcinelli described the state of AIBA's finances as "*catastrophic*".⁷

The primary visionary behind the inspiration to develop a completely new business model was the Executive Director ("ED") Ho Kim ("HK") who was dismissed from the organisation in 2015. Wu rubber stamped its expansion and implementation. The plan was to revolutionize amateur boxing and begin to bring professional boxing into the AIBA fold. In addition to the Olympics, other multi-sport events and AIBA international tournaments, they dreamed of a semi-professional league style of play between city-based franchises in regional conferences that would bring in new income streams for the organisation. Aside from gate receipts and event sponsorship revenues, additional income streams were envisaged from selling television and broadcasting rights. From this inspiration was born the World Series of Boxing ("WSB") and later the Boxing Marketing Arm ("BMA"). Together, they planned on using the BMA, an AIBA

⁷ He further cited the pressures of resolving AIBA's 'catastrophic' situation and under pressure by the IOC as a reason for standing down a few months later (See Chapter 3).

marketing subsidiary corporation that would be responsible for the promotion and marketing of these quasi professional tournaments.

At the outset of creating this new reality for amateur boxing, the existing revenue streams were incapable of supporting the plans for expansion. The majority of their funding for the sport was obtained from the IOC, with smaller amounts derived from gate receipts, sponsorship and broadcasting rights. Like all start-ups, the visionary dream required strategy, a realistic business plan, investment, a realistic financial plan and most of all the execution of the strategy. Wu saw himself as the primary driver of both business and investment plans and identifying the possible investor partners.

At first, HK managed the operations of the WSB in its early stages after its formation in 2009. He was also involved in the administration of the BMA. As the operations grew it was dragging him away from his primary duties at AIBA. HK's workload required him to relinquish some of the tasks associated with his many roles. The decision was made to hire a WSB Director. From that point on, the management of the WSB suffered from cronyism, through the use of underqualified individuals and unrealistic expectations of hiring high quality managers on small salaries. These budgetary constraints also resulted in the hiring of the BMA Director (David Gough) who had marketing experience but lacked the necessary television experience and connections to build an income stream to support the operations of the BMA. Where the business plan had envisioned tens of millions of dollars of broadcasting revenues, the BMA Director was only able to secure 1.5 Million during his tenure. For the BMA, HK had wanted to recruit an individual who had experience selling TV and broadcasting rights. However, the salaries for an individual with that experience far exceeded the budget allocated by the BMA.

Wu entrusted the administration and financial planning of the WSB American Operations ("AO") to Abe Lin (a Chinese citizen from Taiwan then resident in the USA), a childhood friend that Wu instructed to be hired, despite the fact that he was the subject of a criminal investigation into allegations that he was trading in state secrets during his time in the Taiwanese military. It seems

to be the case that Lin reported privately and exclusively to Wu on the state of WSB finances and operations in the Americas. As of 2017 he was still under contract to AIBA as a financial consultant. The MIIT concludes that the cronyism here exacerbated an already less than optimal business administration action plan and execution. Indeed, many witnesses advised the MIIT that Lin was incompetent and unable to perform the role required to launch and sustain the WSB vision. This incompetence spread to him being unable to keep complete records and ultimately being unable to account for the significant funds he had been sent and was using to finance the WSB AO.

The market thought to exist for fans to watch franchised boxing bouts as outlined in the business plan was in fact illusory and highly optimistic. To the extent that a market might be built, the marketing and PR failed to bring the fans to the competitions. Broadcasting and arena planning were both too late and inadequate. This was in part due to the fact that the tight control exerted by Wu, requiring every detail to be personally authorised through his Taipei office using a cumbersome fax process, significantly hampered the efforts to make advanced arrangements. As a result, for the inaugural bouts of the WSB Americas, hardly any promotional or marketing activity was undertaken in advance. Lastly, perhaps it was as a result of the poor marketing, promotion and PR but ultimately there was no product market fit. It was clear, even at that time, that those charged with running the program were unable to efficiently undertake the required tasks and lacked the experience to do so. The best illustration of this was the booking of the 20,000 seat American Airlines Arena in Miami as the venue for the inaugural bouts of the WSB. Less than 150 tickets were sold, far below the financial plan projections.

Given the grand plan and financial projections, the WSB and the BMA quickly became a project that had to succeed – its failure could compromise the very existence of the AIBA. Wu sought out further investors to save the visionary plan. A critical evaluation of progress at this date might have identified the problems and helped develop a realistic exit strategy. Instead, disintegration and insolvency loomed. Without the people, the promotion and market fit, the financial obligations taken on by Wu that overburdened the organisation were essentially wasted. In this

difficult financial situation, Wu resorted to desperate measures that unwittingly pulled him down the path of deception and mischaracterization of the financial affairs of AIBA (See Chapter 3 and Stage 1 Report).

The continuing missteps and mistakes created a situation where investor monies were not deployed effectively and the investors were deprived of any possible return on their investment as the organisation mismanaged their expectations for the development of the enterprises. Instead of investor financing being used to grow the market and customer base, it was being used to ineffectively launch a product and then plug its various holes as it continued to sink deeper into debt. It was a house of cards consistently on the verge of collapsing until another investor would come along and stabilise it, albeit momentarily. As a result, for nearly a decade AIBA hovered precariously on the line between solvency and insolvency. This state of affairs only changed with financing provided by Gazprom in 2021. Whatever the debate about the source of funds, exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is no doubt that the Gazprom sponsorship has saved AIBA and helped the organisation onto a solid financial footing. Concerns have been raised over future funding, but this debate is outside the scope of the MIIT's remit and this Report.

The responsibility of this near collapse falls on the management of AIBA along with President Wu. The President's contribution was keeping the Executive Committee ("EC") completely ill-informed and misrepresenting what was going on financially within AIBA as a result of the marketing catastrophe of WSB. Contracts were signed by him without EC deliberation or approval. Eventually when the strain on the organisation became such that Wu could no longer hide the financial reality, the EC demanded an audit. Between the years 2008 until 2018 the organisation commissioned four financial reviews by various accounting and investigation firms to understand if there was any corruption and whether any of its funds were improperly discharged. The MIIT has reviewed all of those reports and examined the current financial records. This chapter outlines and hopefully removes much of the speculation and gossip surrounding the financial obligations of the organisation.

4.2 The Financial Investments into the WSB and the BMA

The entities that brought AIBA to the verge of financial ruin were the WSB and the BMA. This section provides brief background on these entities in order to understand the flow of investment money below.

4.2.1 WSB

The idea behind the WSB was to bridge the worlds of Olympic boxing and professional boxing in a semi-professional league style of play. Teams would consist of several boxers playing for regional franchise teams. In 2009, AIBA entered into an agreement with International Marketing Group (“IMG”) on a partnership for the WSB project. Following this agreement, IMG had 25% of WSB shares and was supposed to do all marketing activities and to find all WSB franchises. The franchise model initially conceived, where each of the competing teams were independently run and managed with AIBA merely facilitating the tournament, proved difficult to launch worldwide. For over one year, IMG could not find any franchisees; therefore, AIBA decided to find franchises on its own and bought back the 25% of its WSB shares from IMG. They parted ways because of different views on the viability of the project.

The keystone thought to be critical to the success of the venture were the operations in the USA. However, AIBA could not find willing franchise buyers. This led to the decision that AIBA would run and operate American franchises via its WSB structure. It proceeded to incorporate four USA and one Mexican franchise. It took two years to build the WSB business and find franchise owners who wanted to purchase a licence, as many were only motivated by the commercial side of the business. Others were more political in that they were backed by their NOCs who thought it a good way to develop the boxers. Some Federations claimed that they were bullied into joining, on the basis if they didn't it would affect their AIBA relationship.

In the franchise model as initially conceived, AIBA would have had little financial exposure to the everyday costs required to operate a franchise (e.g., salaries, administration costs, organising and

hosting matches, etc.). The variation of the model meant that the North American franchises were now being operated and funded by AIBA. It had assumed all of the associated financial risk. In other jurisdictions, such as Cuba, Russia and Argentina for example, AIBA maintained the franchise model and found clubs willing to purchase franchise licenses to compete in WSB events. The original model was now morphed into a hybrid structure with some independently owned and operated franchises, along with AIBA funded and operated franchises. The initial visionary dream which foresaw little to no investment or financial risk to AIBA was in reality the exact opposite. The consequence was that there was an acute awareness that there was a desperate need for capital to progress the development of the WSB.

4.2.2 BMA

The BMA entity was constituted to provide the marketing and promotion of the WSB and AIBA Pro Boxing (“APB”), AIBA’s professional boxing arm. Additionally, the BMA was to secure television and broadcasting rights for WSB and APB events. AIBA owned 45% of the BMA. The remaining 55% of shares was divided as follows: 20% of shares owned by Skiff, a Kazakh company owned by the Kazakh Boxing Federation, and 35% to a Chinese investor, First Commitment International Trade Company Ltd. (“FCIT”) (Hong Kong registered; Mr Di Wu). The BMA has since started a corporate dissolution process as of 2019.


The inaugural investor into the BMA was Skiff who provided 10 Million USD as a share purchase to effectively launch the operations in 2012. When that money ran out, Wu negotiated an investment of 35 Million USD from his friend, the Chinese investor Di Wu in 2014. As a part of that plan Di Wu received a 20 year exclusive license for the Chinese market, and as an unofficial thank you, he was made an Executive Vice President of AIBA. It quickly became evident that the business plan calling for projections in the millions of dollars in yearly revenue was not materialising.

In order for the new corporation BMA to be successful, it needed the franchises of the WSB to bring in revenue to meet their projections. Part of the attraction of the investment in the BMA

was said to be the value of the intangible assets which management insisted on recording on the BMA's balance sheet despite contrary accounting advice. The intangible assets included "investments" in the USA, Mexico, Great Britain and German markets. In each of these markets AIBA had established AIBA owned WSB franchises which were funded by loans from WSB and AIBA to be eventually paid back by the BMA. The USA and Mexico franchises were never profitable and had constant losses over five years. However, the "investment" in these markets was deemed necessary for any potential forecasted revenues to be delivered in future years according to the BMA business plan.

There were critical misrepresentations and deliberate concealment of the BMA investment funds to both the investors and the EC. The "investments" in the USA and Mexico operations up until the end of 2015 totaled around 27 Million CHF; however 10 Million CHF of this was never recorded. This involves the loan from Benkons that was never disclosed on any of the entities accounting records. In addition, the Chinese investor was not aware at the time of his investment that an additional 10 Million USD had been spent in the USA and Mexico, because it was not recorded in the books, nor disclosed in the due diligence process.

The financial figures in the 2014 Congress Report were concealed. These were the fees payable to AIBA from the BMA as part of the management services agreements between the two entities. These figures were based on the unrealistic business plan which depicted the revenues to be artificially high. The reality was that the BMA had cash flow issues that could not sustain its operations. The following chart illustrates the flow of funds.



4.3 Investments were Equity, Near Equity or Loans

AIBA secured 39 Million USD of investments through a combination of debt financing and capital investments. The key arrangements were a 10 Million USD loan from an Azerbaijan based company, Benkons; a 10 Million USD investment in the BMA from a Kazakhstan based company, Skiff; and a not fully completed investment of only 19 Million USD from a Hong Kong registered company, FCIT, controlled by Wu's friend Di Wu. The agreement further called for Di Wu to invest the remaining 16 Million of the original 35 Million agreement, but this payment was never made

despite many attempts to persuade him to do so. Throughout this period Di Wu continued to maintain his position on the Board, thus having access to the inner workings of AIBA.

These perhaps difficult to characterize investment agreements caused AIBA to take on additional financial risk that it was not able to adequately cover or repay as required with the revenues it anticipated from the WSB or the BMA. Therefore, these hard to characterize transactions resulted in either: (i) AIBA or its subsidiaries assuming large debt liabilities; or (ii) AIBA or its subsidiaries selling shares in its key asset (i.e. marketing rights to AIBA-sanctioned tournaments).

4.3.1 The Benkons Loan

The WSB was launched in 2009 with a vision of having 12 franchises across the Americas. By 2010, however, and despite approaching various possible investors, there had been no success in procuring the necessary funds to initiate the WSB Americas according to plan. Opportunity arose to secure its funding while Wu and HK were at the AIBA President's Cup in December 2009, in Baku, Azerbaijan. Wu and HK had a meeting with Kamaladdin Heydarov, the President of the Azerbaijan Boxing Federation and the holder of the office of Minister of Special Situations. Wu introduced the WSB program to Kamaladdin Heydarov in detail and requested his support, with a special focus on the WSB franchises in the USA and Mexico.

Kamaladdin Heydarov was the matchmaker between AIBA and the investor, Benkons. The strategy was to describe the investment as an attractive short-term venture with a full return on their investment to be made in three years. The potential lenders were assured that the project had guaranteed profitability, but also guaranteed investors interest on their investment if the business profit targets were not reached. Benkons would only agree to the investment if it was structured as debt financing. Benkons eventually signed the agreement for a loan investment of 10 Million USD to the WSB Americas operation, guaranteed by AIBA. The documentation was never reviewed by the EC and was sealed in a safe in the offices of AIBA in Lausanne. The guarantee aspect of the arrangement meant that when WSB defaulted, the obligation to repay would fall on AIBA.

Bakinco was a Swiss based company of the Benkons Group of Companies from Azerbaijan. On 17 November 2010, WSB AO SA, Bakinco SA, AIBA and WSB SA entered into an agreement whereby Bakinco would provide a loan in the amount of 10,000,000 USD due on 17 November 2013 to WSB AO SA. The purpose of the loan would be for the development of the WSB in North America and Canada. This arrangement is referred to as the "Swiss Lending Agreement."

Subsequently, AIBA was informed that Bakinco was no longer operational and this agreement was cancelled and a new agreement with the same terms was entered into by the parties replacing the Swiss Lender with Benkons MMC. Later, when explaining the transaction to the IOC and further giving it to the SIC inquiry, Wu used the cancelled agreement between AIBA and the Swiss Lender.⁸ The result of the switch of the lending party became the source of much speculation within AIBA. There were allegations of corruption including speculation that the funds were used improperly and that the funds had "disappeared" - all of which were inaccurate. Wu's decision to use the cancelled agreement with the Swiss Lender caused unnecessary confusion and distrust among the AIBA members who alleged that the Benkons loan was not being used to expand the WSB franchises. The IOC President asked that Wu initiate a forensic audit related to this loan to determine if any of the speculation was correct. The audit into the flow of funds was conducted by PWC and concluded that while the funds were indeed being used to expand the WSB AO, there was inadequate management of those funds.

The repayment of 8 Million dollars of the loan was made to Benkons who waived all accrued interest. The balance had been reduced by 2 Million through agreement between President GR and Benkons to consider those funds as sponsorship. The repayment of the funds was accomplished in two tranches, one in April and the other in May of 2021. By 21 May 2021 the loan was fully repaid. Benkons confirmed by a letter of that same date from the Benkons President Hamid Hamidov that the full payment of the loan has been discharged. The MIIT reviewed all documents and traced the audit trail of the money to establish that the payment had been made as stated.

⁸ The SIC report did not indicate that there was connection of the loan to a minister or government.

4.3.2 Skiff Promotion Investment

Skiff is the marketing investment company operated and owned by the Kazakhstan Boxing Federation. Skiff was an initial investor and 20% shareholder in the BMA which was registered in Switzerland in 2012 having invested 10 Million USD. The BMA's purpose was to promote worldwide the WSB and APB, but seed funding was needed to launch. Skiff decided to become involved given the claimed future projects of the APB, WSB and AIBA Open Boxing. Both Wu and HK were the principals involved in developing this arrangement with Skiff, although they claimed that they were unaware that the organisation was owned by the Kazakhstan Boxing Federation and funded by the Kazakh government. The investment was to be paid in three instalments. The last one was due to be transferred directly to the AIBA account when the BMA was officially registered. This occurred in July 2012.

The BMA business plan, originally written by the ED and PWC, used to sell the idea to investors was flawed from its inception. The plan was extremely complicated. It was described to the MIIT as a fanciful plan with hyperinflated projections. One of the myriad issues with it was the existence of large license payments and service management fees to AIBA from the BMA. Ultimately payments to AIBA were cycled via the BMA (see previous chart). The detailed financial plan was largely hidden from the EC and what was presented to the 2014 Congress. What was shown to those bodies was based on a business plan which showed revenues to be artificially high.

The shareholder agreement between Skiff and the BMA resulted in the President of the Kazakh Boxing Federation being a board member of the organisation. This becomes an important detail in 2017 when discussing the financial status of the BMA.

At an extraordinary meeting of the EB held in Albena, Bulgaria, called the Albena Hearing, representatives of Skiff were invited to answer questions about their loan. The biggest issue for Skiff at this meeting was that the board had voted that the BMA was bankrupt and they would move to dissolve it. However, Skiff objected and stated to the meeting that the Kazakh board

member did not vote. They expected their loan to be returned. HK tried to explain that Skiff still held 20% in the BMA, which was not bankrupt in reality. It was suggested by HK that this was a strategic decision taken by Wu to declare the company bankrupt in order to eliminate the 19 Million USD loan from FCIT. Skiff became a victim of that process.

4.3.3 FCIT Investment

The FCIT investment came at a critical point in the history of the BMA and WSB saga. It appears to have been thought that the BMA and WSB could and should not fail. The BMA and WSB were essential to the long term success of AIBA who would be unable to otherwise survive. Yet they were critically close to failing. As a consequence of the previous agreement with Benkons, if the BMA and WSB failed, AIBA would not likely have been able to stay afloat. The franchises were nearly all operating at losses with limited revenues coming into the BMA. The Di Wu investment gave this whole dream the injection needed to survive.

On 7 July 2014, FCIT, represented by Mr. Di Wu, and AIBA, represented by Wu, signed a framework agreement whereby FCIT agreed to invest 35,000,000 CHF against shares in the BMA. It was agreed that FCIT would purchase 35% of the shares in the BMA from AIBA against a payment of 35 Million CHF paid to AIBA. The scheme was for AIBA to re-invest, as a non-reimbursable contribution, the same amount to the BMA. Thus, at the end, FCIT was to become a shareholder of the BMA. In addition, AIBA agreed to a 20-year exclusive license for the Chinese market to be granted by the BMA to BMA China, a wholly owned subsidiary of FCIT. The deal was supposed to have been executed through three agreements including a share purchase agreement between AIBA and FCIT; a share transfer agreement between AIBA and FCIT; and a licence agreement between the BMA and BMA China.

According to the framework agreement, the investment was to be made in three installments: (i) 7,000,000 CHF on 14 July 2014; (ii) 8,000,000 CHF on 30 September 2014; and, (iii) 20,000,000 CHF on 30 November 2014. Certain conditions were required to be completed, such as the execution of the three above mentioned agreements. However, FCIT only made two payments -

7,000,000 CHF on 15 July 2014, and a second payment of 8,000,000 CHF on 4 November 2014. The payments were made to AIBA, and then reinvested into the BMA as per the framework agreement. While it did not make the payments according to the schedule set out in the framework agreement, it did throughout the course of 2015 complete several other payments which totaled 2 Million USD. The share purchase and share transfer agreements remained outstanding and no share certificates were transferred to FCIT.

The fact that the shares were issued and available to be transferred but were never registered put the very existence of the BMA at risk. In the first quarter of 2016 the BMA's auditor, KPMG, informed the BMA that a loan of approximately 19,000,000 CHF appearing in the books of this company would result in an over indebtedness of the BMA if such claims were not subordinated and the BMA would be required to declare bankruptcy. According to the accounting rules, since the share purchase and share transfer certificates remained outstanding, the funds were classified as debt pending execution. In the beginning of July 2016, draft subordination agreements for the financial years 2014, 2015 and 2016 were sent to FCIT. They were executed by Di Wu on 30 June 2016 and the debt occurring on the records of the BMA was reclassified as a "subordinated loan." This results in such claim not being payable unless the BMA is no longer over indebted.

After attempts from AIBA to find a resolution to FCIT's failure to execute the share purchase and share transfer agreements; not adhere to the payment schedule as agreed to in the framework agreement; and declare the business activities of the BMA China, AIBA decided to terminate all of the relationships with FCIT and BMA China. Another investor was sought, but no such investment ever materialised. The BMA and WSB continued to function in a precarious financial position; so much so that after Wu's resignation attempts were made by the interregnum Presidents to revive the share purchase and share transfer agreements to no avail.

The BMA was declared bankrupt on 19 April 2018. FCIT did not file its claims deriving from the subordinated loan agreements in the bankruptcy and the bankruptcy claim proceedings were closed on 2 April 2019.

4.4 Conclusion

At the time of writing this Report, the catastrophic state of AIBA finances described above is now a legacy of the Wu presidency. The financial input by Gazprom put an end to the jeopardy that AIBA put itself in and saved it from financial collapse. Whatever the debate of the source of the funds, it has ensured the continuing survival of the IBA.

Chapter 5: Protect, Detect and Prevent Corruption in the Field of Play

5.1 Introduction

Corruption within the FOP is the greatest risk to the viability of boxing today. The Stage 3 Report referred to issues identified in and around the Field of Play (“FOP”), that either enabled corruption to flourish or led to the perceptions that it was occurring. The manipulation of bouts by corrupt officials is an ongoing problem at Confederation and National level competitions. The presence of the MIIT staff at marquee events such as the World Championships has reduced considerably the lack of trust in the officiating process, particularly amongst R&Js and ITOs. While the IBA has reiterated its no tolerance approach to dealing with FOP corruption and steps have been taken through investment in vetting and monitoring processes, there continues to be reports of issues related to the FOP.

At large international events such as the 2021 Men’s World Championships in Belgrade, Serbia and the 2022 Women’s World Championships in Istanbul, Turkey the vetting process and the presence of MIIT investigators had a positive impact on the integrity of the tournament. Some officials were either flagged through the vetting process used by the MIIT prior to the event or identified through the Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) process implemented at the event as high risk and removed from it. As a result of these interventions, other officials who may have attempted to manipulate bouts with impunity were deterred by the consequences of being ejected from the competition. However, at smaller events hosted at the Confederation level, the MIIT has determined that corrupt practices such as R&J signalling or breaches in FOP rules and procedures continue but are nonetheless reduced when MIIT staff are present.

Manipulation within the FOP is not confined to those unethical officials who ultimately referee or judge a particular bout. There are other root causes or contributing factors which facilitate problems within the FOP. One of the contributing factors is the influence that officials’ peers, senior competition personnel, Federation members or external actors may have over judging and

refereeing decisions. The victims of this pressure of influence are more likely to be sanctioned, while those instigating the behaviour often go unpunished.

Methods of proactive enforcement action implemented by the MIIT alone, however, cannot solve the problems of corruption. The MIIT has in its previous Report made recommended changes to the policies related to both the FOP and discipline. Some of these recommended changes are currently underway. Policies to tackle corruption are already in place in the form of the Code of Conduct and disciplinary processes but these need to be fully utilised and enforced in order to bring about a real cultural change. See the final chapter where the recommendations made in Stage 3 are summarised and identified as adopted, partially adopted and yet to have been adopted together with the recommendations arising out of this Report.

This chapter of the Stage 2 Report examines in greater detail the actual and potential corruption issues that exist at all levels of officiating. How corruption issues have manifested themselves at IBA and Continental Confederation tournaments and the remedial steps that have already been taken in an attempt to reduce the historic elements of corruption previously identified and reported are summarised by the various examples set out in this chapter. Throughout those examples, recommendations are made to strengthen the current administrative and automated systems to stop those intent on corrupting the sport and provide barriers to their attempted corruption.

As the title of this chapter indicates, there are three main pillars to fairer officiating and bout results that need to be fully addressed to build further confidence in the sport. Each of the pillars - protect, prevent and detect - are discussed separately. Their absence and related consequences are illustrated in the examples below.

5.2 Corruption Issues Continue to be Identified – Breaches of Code of Conduct/Code of Ethics⁹ and other FOP Concerns

All boxing officials (including competition officials) accredited by the IBA are bound by both the Code of Conduct and Code of Ethics which came into force in 2021.

The rules as they relate to conduct within the FOP, are designed to protect officials, ensure the integrity of the bout and prevent real or perceived allegations of corruption. Even minor breaches of the Codes, however insignificant they may appear, in and around the FOP foster the activities of those intent on corrupting the sport. If all rule violations are not adequately sanctioned it sends a subliminal message to both officials and the wider boxing audience that these types of actions are deemed acceptable. The requirement to abide by these rules needs to be clearly understood and strictly enforced at all times, with a defined set of penalties imposed upon those found to have breached them.

The following alleged Code of Conduct violations have been identified by or brought to the attention of the MIIT during more recent tournaments. However, some of these Code violations have been blighting the sport for years. Specific events and individuals have not been identified due to the fact that some of the incidents highlighted are the subject of ongoing investigations which could be prejudiced by disclosure in this Report. Nevertheless, IBA senior personnel are aware of many of the areas of concern detailed below. In the majority of cases, steps are already being taken through enforcement or policy amendments to prevent or reduce the likelihood of future occurrences.

5.2.1 Signalling

Signalling techniques (predominantly facial or body movements) are designed to be used within the FOP to enable those corrupt officials to share and/or influence scoring decisions through

⁹ The 2021 Code of Conduct states that it applies to Boxing Competition Officials, Team Officials, Boxing Athletes or Delegates.

subtle bodily movements, about which only they are aware. This activity has been prevalent for many years and the techniques used are constantly being adapted or changed in order to avoid detection.

In one recent incident investigated by the MIIT, the official concerned suggested that this type of activity was not in fact bout manipulation but simply an exchange of information to protect officials from being isolated on a 4-1 decision. Their concern was that such an isolated decision might impact their future appointments. The MIIT's opinion is that any clandestine signalling system employed during a bout is designed to both circumvent the scrutiny of the appointed evaluators and influence the independent scoring of other judges. Therefore, such conduct is by its very nature and irrespective of the reason, tantamount to bout manipulation and a breach of the Code of Conduct.

The subtle signalling techniques employed by corrupt officials are by their very nature difficult to detect. Thus, fully assessing how widespread this practice has become is nearly impossible. There is, however, significant anecdotal evidence to suggest that it is relatively commonplace amongst certain language and geographically aligned groups, which is a serious concern to the integrity of any competition.

The new vetting process, and onsite attendance by the MIIT, supported by information provided by ethical officials and IBA staff, is already assisting in developing the intelligence picture. Those believed to be involved are now coming under greater scrutiny, and when identified, the MIIT will recommend that full disciplinary procedures be instigated and sanctions imposed. One case relating to this practice has already been submitted to the IBA legal department for review and onward transmission to the Ethics Commission for further action.

5.2.2 Unjustifiable Scoring

A recent incident highlighted a manipulation practice whereby one judge went against the majority and scored significantly against the consensus of the other R&Js assigned to officiate that bout. The MIIT finds that this was an attempt to swing results in favour of a particular boxer or country. In this case, the suspicious scoring occurred on three separate occasions during one session of a quarterfinal round, where winning would assure prize money and at least a bronze medal. An independent review of these bouts was commissioned with the findings supporting this alleged corrupt activity. It confirmed to the MIIT that at least one bout win had been awarded to the wrong boxer.

5.2.3 Unjustifiable Warnings Issued by Referees

Similar to the scoring incident discussed above, the ring referee issued two warnings to a boxer in the same bout, resulting in points deductions by the judges. This incident was partially seen and noted by the tournament Technical Delegate (“TD”) and upon subsequent review by an independent IBA evaluator both warnings were considered to be unjustified. On this occasion the actions of the referee did not directly impact the outcome. However, it is clear that if the bout had been a closer decision, this corrupt behaviour would have undoubtedly been responsible for a different and unjust result.

5.2.4 Peer Pressure to Manipulate Bouts

This form of corruption continues and appears because of the historical culture of the sport. Some officials wrongly believe that it is an acceptable practice to constantly inform their officiating colleagues of the qualities of a nation’s boxer. The purpose of the comments is to pressure the approached official(s) to possibly feel obliged to score the bout in that nation’s favour. Some members of the boxing family view this as a relatively harmless practice. It is not.

New, inexperienced or otherwise impressionable R&Js may be more susceptible to this type of intimidation due to their lack of experience.

The fact of peer pressure is hard to establish and is easily denied. There is an increasing need for ethical R&Js to understand that reporting this type of behaviour will not result in retaliation. It is only in this way that the practice can be eliminated. Two incidents of peer pressure were identified by the MIIT at recent tournaments. Furthermore, a review of past intelligence suggests that this was, and still is, one of the most prevalent types of manipulation foisted on R&Js. The MIIT has established a database recording all such allegations. As new incidents are reported to the TD or the MIIT, the database will highlight alleged serial offenders. That will trigger more in-depth investigative scrutiny and potential disciplinary action. In the past there has been no database by which to assess current misconduct.

5.2.5 Competition Officials Engaging with Third Parties Away from the Tournament Venue^{10,11,12}

Despite the Code of Conduct being clear, some TDs disregard the obligation to not engage with Federation representatives and others away from the competition venue. Of greater concern is the situation where matters are discussed relating directly to the tournament and on occasion to specific bouts. At a recent championships an International Technical Official (“ITO”) went to a hotel for a pre-arranged meeting with a Federation President to apparently explain the results of a bout protest. While there, he was enticed into a hotel room to meet a person who was supposedly a Federation President. Upon entry he was subjected to pressure directed at receiving a bribe to influence the outcome of one or more bouts.

¹⁰ Code of Conduct Section 1.4 - *I shall not in any circumstances, directly or indirectly, solicit, accept, or offer any form of remuneration or commission, nor any concealed benefit, service or gift of any nature that could be considered as a bribe or undue influence.*

¹¹ Code of Conduct Section 2.0 – *I must immediately upon receipt, report any approaches or offers, such as those described under paragraphs 1.4/1.5, directly to the Technical Delegate or to the AIBA appointed staff.*

¹² Code of Conduct Section 4.4.

This case is the subject of an ongoing investigation and hence cannot be detailed further. It is clear, however, that these incidents would be less likely to arise if senior officials did not breach the Code of Conduct rules in relation to external engagement, which clearly states that *“I shall not communicate with anyone about any event related issue within the competition venue and/or any other location of the full duration of the Championships and post event.”*¹³

5.2.6 Competition Officials Engaging with Officials at the Tournament Venue¹⁴

Breaches of the Code of Conduct beyond the tournament venue, as detailed above, can occur within the tournament venues as the MIIT has observed. The problem at the venue arises because Federation and/or team officials as well as those unconnected in any official capacity, have gained access to the FOP while not required to be there. Their purpose being primarily to engage in beneficial conversations for whomever they represent.

Invasion of the FOP by those not required to be there is prohibited by written policies and procedures. The purpose of such regulations is to protect the integrity of the competition and the tournaments officials legitimately required to be in the FOP. The experience of the MIIT, however, is that FOP access demarcation lines are often blurred and segregation requirements not always strictly enforced by security personnel. The problem can be exacerbated though the close proximity of the VIP areas to the FOP. Lack of strict enforcement of the rules has enabled unauthorised persons, frequently following contested bout results, to access the FOP for the purpose of placing undue pressure on officials to review bouts in a manner more favourable to a particular boxer or nation.

¹³ Code of Conduct Section 4.4 - *“I shall not communicate with anyone about any event related issue within the competition venue and/or any other location of the full duration of the Championships and post event, especially to persons from my own country such as National Federation members, Board members, the media, the public. I shall not comment about any competition related issue on social media during or post event, nor shall I display any photographs during the Championships that may cause any kind of conflict or undue comment.”*

¹⁴ Code of Conduct Section 4.4.

Preventing FOP access breaches are not the responsibility of competition officials. However, persons not entitled to be in the FOP are nonetheless breaching the access for the purpose of influencing the bout outcome. The situation arises particularly when Protest Rule 20 is in effect. On those occasions there are clear protocols in place if a team or representatives of a team want to protest a bout result. However, that legitimate intervention request is not an open invitation to engage in conversation of an influential nature with a competition official. Such activity is in clear contravention of the Code of Conduct.

5.2.7 Senior Officials Manipulating the Draw¹⁵

Manual amendments to the R&J draw carried out by senior ITOs can be susceptible to improper motivations or reasons for adjusting the draw. Ability for changing the draw and the right to make the alterations are within the authority of a limited number of ITOs. Nevertheless manual amendments to the draw open the process up to potential manipulation by unscrupulous officials.

In a recently reported incident, an ITO replaced 2 R&Js in a particular bout. The ITO claimed this was necessary due to overuse and incompetence and additionally alleged that they had been removed from the officiating pool by the R&J evaluators. None of this was correct. A boxer in the bout and the ITO shared the same nationality. This attempted manipulation, however, never materialised because it was identified by IBA staff and the original R&Js returned to their officiating positions.

Despite the presence of MIIT investigators, they were not given the opportunity to investigate the alleged incident with the persons concerned. Nonetheless, this type of activity, undertaken for whatever reason and without oversight, can easily become part of a larger manipulative process, or at least construed as such.

¹⁵ Code of Conduct Section 4.1/4.3.

It is recommended that for the protection of all those involved and for the prevention of potential manipulation, an additional level of independent oversight is introduced to the draw process. This would ensure that a single individual, even as the senior technical official, would not be able dictate manual amendments made to the automated draw, without full justification and approval.

5.2.8 The Use of Mobile Telephones by Officials in FOP Restricted Areas¹⁶

The use of mobile telephones or other electronic devices by officials at tournament venues is an ongoing issue, despite clarity within the Code of Conduct which prohibits their use and carriage unless specifically authorised for the purpose of undertaking an assigned role. Two breaches of the rules were identified by MIIT investigators in recent tournaments they attended. One of these was reported to the MIIT by an R&J who advised that in the case in question, the practice was stopped once identified by senior officials. In a second incident, two mobile phones were taken from a senior ITO who was caught attempting to make calls within the arena despite having earlier been warned against doing so. In an interview with the MIIT, the ITO in question displayed a complete disregard for the rules, stating that the rule concerning mobile phones was ridiculous and should not be enforced.

R&Js in particular can spend lots of time in the R&J lounge awaiting their turn to officiate and some argue that use of their phone to access social media and family during these periods relieves some of the boredom. These arguments are perhaps understandable; however, the rules are put in place for good reason: to prevent any outside influences or contacts that may impact an official's ability to remain impartial. Along with other sections of the Code where breaches have been identified, it is imperative that this particular activity stop. *It is recommended that*

¹⁶ Code of Conduct Section 4.8 - I shall not use nor carry any electronic communication device, including but not limited to a mobile phone, a laptop, and a tablet computer, inside the competition venue. Exceptionally, the R&J Evaluators and Observers may use laptops to perform their official duties. Ringside Doctors are the exception based on their role requirements.

penalties commensurate with the breaches be imposed on those who continue to disregard the rules.

Instances of conduct violations identified above could be significantly reduced through an ongoing program of education designed to explain the ethical values expected of officials, irrespective of the levels at which they are operating. As well as explaining the zero-tolerance policy and the consequences of its violation, they should also be continually reminded of actions to take when receiving unsolicited approaches and how integrity measures are designed to protect them. With the exception of a small minority intent on corrupting the sport either directly or through third party influence, most officials benefit from the measures put in place to safeguard their integrity and that of the environment in which they operate. It is therefore in their own interest to operate within a framework created for that very reason.

5.3 General Administrative Vulnerabilities at Tournaments

The following issues have come to the attention of the MIIT as a result of their onsite attendance at various tournament venues and include incidents reported to them. The points raised are not specific breaches of any of the regulations as such, but highlight vulnerabilities, which if not addressed, could have an ongoing impact on the real or perceived integrity of a competition. It is important that the same standards of administration and officiating are applied to all levels of international competition, which means that the responsibility for ensuring that best practice is achieved is placed jointly on the IBA and Continental Confederations.

5.3.1 The Requisite Number and Certification Level of Officials

Two issues were identified at recent tournaments in relation to appointments of ITOs for continental championships. In the first incident, with the exception of the Technical Delegate, the majority of the ITOs were provided directly by the Continental or National Federation hosting the event. It is understood that these officials did not have the necessary IBA certifications

required for the roles they were undertaking at a tournament of this level. The lack of IBA certified Deputy Technical Delegates (“DTD”) and R&J Evaluators, put considerable pressure on the TD who, until the final rounds, had in effect two rings to control. The lack of experience and training of the officials in these roles undoubtedly led to one R&J being allowed to continue officiating despite evidence of probable manipulation.

A separate incident at the same tournament involved an R&J judging a bout involving a boxer from his own country. It was not until the end of the second round that the error was noticed and the official replaced. This incident was accepted as a genuine mistake and did not impact the outcome of the bout. Such an error would be less likely to occur if experienced and certified ITOs were appointed at all international championships. At the event in question, the TD rightly noted these shortcomings in the end of competition report.

There have been a number of other instances reported to the MIIT where officials have been appointed to roles for which they have not been trained and certified. The onus is on both the Federation making the appointment and the appointed official, to ensure that this type of error does not occur.

At a separate tournament, there were only two R&J evaluators appointed to cover two rings and no observer. According to the IBA rules, there should be four evaluators and two observers to cover two rings. It is a task of the observer to enter the R&J evaluation scores into a database, but as this position was vacant, the role had to be filled by a member of IBA staff. The evaluators additionally had the task of simultaneously running an R&J training course. At this particular tournament there were allegations of bout manipulation through signalling between certain R&Js, but this information was not passed to tournament officials until late in the competition. Following an IBA request for MIIT investigators to attend on site, one R&J was relieved of his officiating duties and two others subsequently assessed as high risk. This case is now the subject of a disciplinary review.

It is possible in this specific instance that having a full complement of trained officials overseeing each ring may have identified evidence of signalling or poor performance at a much earlier stage in the tournament. This potentially would have allowed for those allegedly involved to be removed from the FOP before their activities could significantly impact bout results.

5.3.2 Lack of Professionalism and/or Control in FOP

There have been reported issues of lack of professionalism by some ITOs when operating within the FOP. Examples of these are detailed below and unless otherwise elaborated are taken to be self-explanatory.

- a) Failing to be in their appointed positions at the start of a bout;*
- b) Not seated in their appointed positions;*
- c) Failure to completely leave or only partially leaving the FOP when one of their own National Federation boxers are in the ring;*
- d) TD and DTD discussing the removal of poor performing R&Js, when this is the job of the evaluators;*
- e) Manual amendments to the R&J draw completed incorrectly;*

On one reported occasion, neutrality issues were identified, requiring two R&Js to be removed from officiating a bout. Removal under these circumstances should be authorised and conducted by the TD or Draw Commissioner, but this was not possible as neither were in the FOP to undertake these duties.

- f) Competition volunteers using refreshment facilities within the R&J lounge;*

Access to the R&J lounge should be tightly administered and controlled. Apart from the R&Js themselves, only those officials with a direct need to access this restricted area

should be authorised to do so. Allowing ostensibly unknown “volunteers” to enter this area for the alleged purpose of obtaining refreshments completely undermines the integrity of the protocols which have been put in place to prevent real or perceived acts of corruption through unauthorised communication.

g) Failure to deal effectively with identified R&J concerns at the time / Reports of unethical behaviour not being dealt with in a timely fashion by senior officials;

There have been a number of instances reported to the MIIT where officials who have attempted to pressure their colleagues to score a bout in a particular manner have been reported to senior ITOs. These issues, however, were not addressed in a timely manner. At the time that such allegations are made, and if considered genuine, it is necessary to remove those subject to the allegations from the tournament while further investigations continue. In the particular incident being described here, the TD’s report noted that the same R&J had been accused of similar behaviour at an earlier event yet despite this was allowed to continue officiating until the end of the tournament.

h) End of Competition Reports by the TD;

End of competition reports compiled by the TD are a vital document in helping Federations understand what went well and what did not during the tournament. Such a report makes it easier to identify and rectify any administrative or corruption issues in future tournaments.

The current TD reporting format is virtually a tick box exercise with little requirement for detail, especially in relation to reporting unethical behaviour by tournament officials or members of Federations. While some TDs do report their concerns, others appear, for whatever reason, unwilling to name or criticise their peers thus allowing potentially corrupt individuals to continue their activities unimpeded. As an example, at a recent

tournament attended by the MIIT where there were allegations of signalling leading to an official being removed from the FOP, this was not recorded at all in the TD's report.

It is a recommendation of the MIIT that the end of competition report format be redesigned to put greater onus on TDs to fully assess the actions of officials and incidents about which concerns have been raised.

Additionally, the TD's report is currently only submitted to the Confederation, where there is no guarantee of how or if allegations of this nature will be pursued.

It is recommended that a copy of all TD reports at Continental Confederation and National Federation level of competition should be sent to the IBA sports department for review, input into the database and take action where appropriate, to ensure that allegations of repeat offending are identified and can be dealt with in the future.

The following is an example of the TD post competition report where everything was recorded as it occurred. The TD referred to the poor and unacceptable quality of the anti-doping procedures at a tournament, citing that the company due to collect the anti-doping samples arrived two hours late, requiring the boxers to wait in the locker room for their test to be administered. Of greater concern is the following passage which reads *"Also i found that the samples was [sic] not real samples - they collected the results in the plastic bottles which easily can be open. I understood that the company was not one accredited by WADA. After i asked to receive more information and i gave a lot of phone calls and messages, i did not received any information."* This is the type of information that needs to be reviewed by the IBA sports department and recorded in the database so that action can be taken at the time or later.

i) *Failure to deal with abuse towards competition officials;*

Recent incidents have been brought to the attention of the MIIT which highlight cases of verbal abuse faced by competition officials from Federation representatives, VIPs, Very VIPs (“VVIPs”) and competitors following unfavourable bout results. It is not necessary to go into further detail regarding these specific incidents. There is no doubt that officials should not have to tolerate this type of behaviour when undertaking their appointed functions in good faith. Where there is a belief that bout results are incorrect or unjust, pathways exist whereby a complaint can be lodged and reviewed. In most cases, and for varying reasons, these acts of verbal abuse and on occasion threats of physical violence go unpunished. This, as with other breaches of the Code previously mentioned, again sends out a subliminal message that this type of behaviour is acceptable and tolerated by the sport. *All cases involving the abuse of officials, no matter in what capacity, should be reported to the IBA Integrity Office for investigation and review, and dealt with in the same manner as any other Code of Conduct violation, irrespective of the position held by the alleged abuser.*

j) *The lack of accreditation oversight for personnel and VVIP passes;*

Accreditation requests for VIP/VVIP’s is generally a decentralised process with both the Confederation and the LOC being able to make and receive accreditation requests and their subsequent authorisation and control. Where IBA is the organiser of the competition it too can make and receive accreditation requests which further decentralises the process.

In principle, once a final list has been created, all accreditation access passes are physically created and issued by the LOC. This is usually done through a locally appointed company, who should also have been advised of the levels of access pertinent to each recipient. This local facilitation process may be expedient and cost effective but can act as a barrier

to investigations, when attempting to identify who authorised the accreditations of specific individuals and to obtain additional details.

The lack of a single system of authorisation and administration of accreditations opens this process up to abuse. Additional names can be added to the list at any stage, and as the national, international and confederation are involved, there is no single point of accountability, should any issues be identified in relation to accredited persons.

k) Unauthorised Access to FOP by Accredited Personnel and VVIP's; and

In some cases there is little or no vetting conducted on VIP dignitaries, most of whom get access to reserved areas at the ringside or in the stands, which adjoin the FOP, and hence bring them within potentially close contact of the competition officials. The opportunity to verbally influence or intimidate these officials is therefore very real and the poor behaviour of some, when results go against their favoured winner, have been personally witnessed by MIIT observers.

Most survey responses (see Chapter 6), and the findings of the MIIT's own research, indicate that VIPs are often personally known to Federation personnel who vouch for them, or who are of sufficiently high status within their relative business, political or sporting communities, and that the vetting process is not considered a requirement. In some cases, accreditation passes are not even issued or the wearing of them is not enforced. It is no real surprise therefore that failings of an accreditation process lacking vetting and accountability came to the fore at a recent high-profile tournament when an alleged VVIP attempted (and may have succeeded) to bribe a senior competition official, in order to influence the outcome of certain bouts. *The MIIT therefore recommends that all VIPs and VVIPs undergo a vetting process prior to the issuing of accreditation.*

l) *Automated Systems Standards and Potential for Abuse.*

The current automated draw and scoring systems need to be upgraded and made fit for purpose. The computerised draw of R&Js, for example, should be a transparent process, with officials selected randomly and subject to a set of neutrality filters designed to prevent biased judging. The more manual amendments that are made, the less transparent the process becomes.

At IBA competitions the contracted Swiss Timing scoring and automated draw system is operated by Swiss Timing employees, whereas at most Continental Confederation tournaments, it is operated by individuals trained and/or appointed by the Local Organising Committee (“LOC”) or National Federation. The difference in these two processes apparently and understandably comes down to cost.

Swiss Timing employees use enhanced software which allows them to add specific filters to prevent certain R&Js from officiating in bouts where their nation is in a known conflict with that of either of the two boxers. The franchised version of the software to which LOC’s have access do not have these additional filters, thus requiring manual changes to be made to the automated draw.

There is some evidence to suggest that manual changes made to the automated draw, which enables certain officials to be replaced by others, is a relatively easy process to undertake and hence subject to abuse. This should not be the case. It is not being suggested that all changes made to automated selection systems are for nefarious reasons. On occasion, senior ITOs who are responsible for administering and overseeing the impartiality of the draw make necessary manual amendments for the “nationality or personal conflict” reasons stated above. However, the lack of oversight in this process can lead to allegations of deliberate manipulation even when there is no basis in fact, thereby undermining the integrity of the process. *Therefore, all manual amendments should be closely and independently scrutinised to avoid allegations of draw manipulation.*

The authority and decision to manually amend a draw sit within the domain of one or two senior officials. With little or no additional oversight, this leaves the process open to real or perceived allegations of corruption. While there is no substantiated evidence to support this, during the course of this enquiry, the MIIT received information suggesting that certain ITOs have used their senior position to amend the R&J draw in order to influence the outcome of specific bouts. The ability of appointed individuals to readily tamper with the draw, by making manual amendments, is a single but important element of a potentially larger corruption process. *It is recommended that automated systems with the full range of filters be adopted for use in all senior tournaments at Confederation level and above, so that instances of manual amendments become a rarity rather than a regular occurrence.*

To complete the recommendation two other steps need to be completed:

1. If necessary, password protected access can be installed to ensure that pre-set neutrality filters cannot be changed without independent oversight. When manual amendments are required, the reasons should be documented, scrutinised and signed off at an appropriate level, by someone independent of the process.
2. System operators need to be professional, ethical, competent and properly trained. An example of where this requirement failed was recently detailed in one TD's end of competition report, where he stated that:

"[The] [f]irst day the scoring system operators and the scoring system was the biggest problem. After the system shut down [a] few times, the scoring system operator inputted the score manually, but he did it wrong".

The operator was apparently very slow in inputting the data and when he did, the scores recorded were not those input by the officiating R&Js.

In conclusion, the MIIT notes that officials, competitors and the wider boxing community require confidence that automated selection processes are fit for purpose and cannot be tampered with for specific advantage. Alleged violations of these protocols need to be investigated and officials involved in this practice sanctioned in accordance with procedures set out in the relevant codes.

5.4 Protect – Creating an Environment to Share Grievances without Repercussions

The foregoing section describes the problems the MIIT investigation has identified. A review of those problems reveals a Federation moving away from its past history. The investigation has assisted the sport in the self-examination of what has transpired in the past. With that historical understanding and the recommendations of the MIIT, the sport can achieve the required level of fair play and administration of an effective International Federation. This section is devoted to demonstrating how the transition from the past can move to completion. The MIIT has identified the pillars of continuous reform to be protection, detection and prevention.

Individuals acting unethically at all levels of the sport create a chaotic and untrustworthy environment. The individuals include not only unethical competition officials, but also senior members of National Federations and Continental Confederations, along with their cronies (businessmen and other VIPs¹⁷) who have infiltrated the sport - either for their own personal gains or because of a belief that it is culturally acceptable for a nation to win at all costs.

The investigation has identified unethical and corrupt behaviours within the sport including verbal intimidation, bribery, coercion and placing pressure on otherwise ethical officials to manipulate bouts. These were the common modes of operation designed to ensure that certain countries or individuals prevailed. Steps have been taken to reduce these problems throughout the course of this investigation. Officials who were thought to be the most susceptible to be corrupted were targeted. Some submitted to the pressures and others did nothing; but in both cases, with a few exceptions, they remained silent. A consequence was that ethical officials rarely

¹⁷ See section on accreditations.

felt empowered to report these unethical and corrupt behaviours. Inhibiting the reporting process were concerns for personal safety, retaliation, retribution by the corrupter or the organisation, failure to trust those to whom they were reporting, lack of a robust reporting process, the belief that nothing would change and fearing that reporting these incidents would have a detrimental impact on their own officiating career. While there is validity associated with such concerns, the effect of staying silent created a vortex of systemic corruption and reduced the likelihood of self-reform.

The IBA's task of weeding out the corrupters and the corrupted is significantly improving. However, ensuring the integrity of the sport is a much wider initiative than just the removal of current bad actors. A complete cultural shift is necessary reaching down into the Continental Confederations and National Federations. This shift has already begun with the IBA requesting that the MIIT pilot and implement new integrity screening systems, supported by incumbent trustworthy IBA personnel. Ethical officials now feel more confident in reporting any approaches made to them, with a belief that their allegations will be taken seriously, actively investigated and acted upon creating an umbrella of protection.

The MIIT notes, however, that some officials still feel intimidated by their peers or lack confidence in the systems currently in place. When deciding to report concerns, some would prefer to do so anonymously to protect themselves from potential repercussions, both from those who are the subject of their allegations and through the potential requirement to give open evidence in subsequent disciplinary proceedings. To further encourage these officials, an independent whistleblower methodology of reporting and a more robust evidentiary system where (investigated and tested) confidential information can be used as evidence needs to be established and/or made fit for purpose. Such actions will encourage officials who may still be sceptical to come forward and report concerns. As the cadre of confident officials grows, knowing they will be protected in providing information and evidence of malfeasance, the reforms supporting ethical behaviour and fair play will become increasingly robust.

Reforming steps have been implemented or are in progress through the work of the MIIT leading towards achieving the goal to reform. However, a cultural shift of this magnitude takes time to take effect and become established. The ultimate aim should be to create a pool of only trusted and qualified officials. This will be achieved when individuals committed to a future for boxing begin to see that they are in the majority rather than the minority. The progress, once achieved, will be the barrier to those intent on its continuing corruption.

5.5 Detect

The detection pillar of reform seeks to identify both corrupt individuals and where they may be taking advantage of weaknesses in the system that enable the unfair outcome of bout results. The Stage 1 investigation confirmed the bout manipulation that occurred in the Rio Games. Subsequent stages have found new and different methodologies to achieve the same result of manipulating bouts. In contrast to Rio where an orchestrated system to manipulate bouts was in place, subsequently it appears that manipulation is isolated to individual Federations or individuals with a variety of objectives causing them to manipulate bouts directly or influence others to manipulate bouts.

Through the investigation, the MIIT realised that the FOP was the locus of the corruption resulting in bout manipulation. A way of approaching and dealing with limiting the possibility of corruption in the FOP needed to be found. The MIIT recommended to the IBA the use of a new Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) tool using voice analytics to assist in the identification of officials that might be highly susceptible to corrupt activity.

5.5.1 The Vetting Process

AIBA did not formally vet any of its officials when selecting R&Js or ITOs for any competition prior to the Men’s World Championships in Belgrade, Serbia in October 2021. For the Championships, the MIIT implemented a pre-competition vetting process for all officials in attendance. This

meant that officials being considered to be appointed would be subjected to all or some parts of the vetting process, the results of which would help inform IBA's decision as to whether selected officials would be confirmed to officiate or removed.

At Belgrade, each official underwent the use of the AI tool. The voice analytics sorted individuals into a risk hierarchy from high to low risk with respect to the question set related to corruption. A follow-up interview with officials was undertaken after the results of the AI tool were compiled. Recommendations were made to remove some officials and AIBA acted accordingly. Following Belgrade, the vetting process has been refined and used at five (5) further tournaments.

The initial phases of the process are as follows:

Phase 1 – Opensource Research and Database Checks (Pre-Appointment)

Prior to the IBA formally appointing officials to a tournament they first provided the MIIT with a list of the proposed appointments. The MIIT then conducted several checks and searches to determine if any of the officials had a history of potential corrupt behaviours. These include: Adverse Media and Conflict of Interest Research; Global Sanctions Lists Checks; Politically Exposed Person (PEP) List Checks; and a review of adverse information held on the MIIT database.

The database has been created as a consequence of the lack of organisational memory identified within AIBA. For the first time, the IBA has a centralised record of rule violations operated by the MIIT, as well as other misconduct and allegations collected from the IBA and other sources. This database is constantly updated by new information unearthed by the MIIT during its screening and investigation process.

Phase 2 – AI Questionnaire - Voice Analytics Risk Screening Technology

After officials are appointed and prior to the start of the tournament, onsite investigators of the MIIT deploy the AI technology through an automated telephone program using pertinent

questions. The AI, through voice analytics technology, measures the cognitive response required to answer the questions and determines the level of risk or whether there has been an admission.

Phase 3 – Follow-up Interviews, Assessment and Reporting

Once the questionnaire is completed and results analysed, all participants who return a high risk score and a proportion of those returning potential risk scores are selected for an interview. Pre-appointment due diligence, database intelligence, the questionnaire test scores and any mitigating factors provided by the participant as to why they might have returned a high risk score are all considered before producing a final risk assessment. At any stage during this process, participants identified as being of significant concern to the integrity of the competition are reported to the IBA with recommendations for further action.

Where considered appropriate, investigators have recommended to the IBA that officials identified as high risk for corruption are either not appointed, removed from the competition or their activities are closely monitored for any signs of corrupt or unethical behaviour. For the latter to be effective, oversight by the newly GGRC proposed Integrity Unit will be necessary.

5.5.2 Outcomes of Vetting and Review process

Since the vetting program was piloted during the October 2021 Men's World Championships, MIIT researchers, analysts and investigators have conducted vetting assessments on proposed and/or appointed officials at twelve (12) championships,¹⁸ with five (5) of these benefitting from onsite attendance and use of the AI tool. Where the MIIT has attended the competitions, it has also had the opportunity to view first-hand how automated systems and regulatory procedures actually work in practice and where they may be open to abuse. Comments and recommendations made later in this chapter are designed to assist the IBA to ensure that an

¹⁸ This includes pre-appointment vetting and onsite attendance at specific championships.

acceptable set of standards are reached and maintained across all international and continental championships. Statistical results of MIIT interventions are detailed below.

Below is a list of tournaments where the MIIT has conducted due diligence and database checks:

1. IBA	Men's World Championships	Belgrade, Serbia – October 2021
2. ASBC	U22 Championships	Tashkent, Uzbekistan – January 2022
3. EUBC	73 rd Strandja International Tournament	Sofia, Bulgaria – February 2022
4. ASBC	Youth and Junior Championships	Amman, Jordan – February 2022
5. EUBC	U22 Championships	Porec, Croatia – March 2022
6. AMBC	Continental Championships	Guayaquil, Ecuador – March 2022
7. EUBC	Youth Championships	Sofia, Bulgaria – April 2022
8. EUBC	Men's Elite Championships	Armenia – May 2022
9. IBA	Women's World Championships	Istanbul, Turkey – May 2022
10. ASBC	Southeast Asia Games	Hanoi, Vietnam – May 2022
11. AMBC	Bolivarian Games	Valledupar, Colombia – June 2022
12. IBA	Commonwealth Games	Birmingham, UK – July/August 2022

The MIIT was on site and attended the following competitions and used the AI tool:

1. IBA	Men's World Championships	Belgrade, Serbia – October 2021
2. EUBC	73 rd Strandja International Tournament	Sofia, Bulgaria - February 2022
3. EUBC	U22 Championships	Porec, Croatia – March 2022
4. IBA	Women's World Championships	Istanbul, Turkey – May 2022
5. EUBC	Men's Elite Championships	Yerevan, Armenia – May 2022

The statistical results of the vetting program are:

Number of:

- Officials having undergone Phase 1 vetting checks = 309
- Officials having undertaken the Challenger AI Risk Screening Process = 163
- Officials Interviewed = 68
- High risk officials removed from competition and/or not recommended for future appointment at competitions = 22
- Potential risk officials recommended for close monitoring if appointed to competitions = 15
- Investigations conducted by the MIIT or with MIIT support = 6¹⁹
- Cases submitted to the IBA Legal Counsel for recommended disciplinary action by the Ethics Committee = 3²⁰

MIIT investigators attended two of the above championships at short notice, those in Croatia and Bulgaria, following a direct request from senior IBA personnel concerned about specific allegations of bout manipulation. Three separate investigations were conducted during these two visits and the findings reported to IBA Legal Counsel. The results of the investigations were that: two cases were submitted for review with a recommendation for disciplinary action by the Ethics Committee; and officials of concern were identified and recommended not be appointed until the vetting process was completed. One of these investigations emerged from information provided by a competition official who reported his concerns over bout manipulation to senior IBA personnel, who in turn contacted the MIIT to investigate. The chain of events that led to this investigation highlights the significant and vital contribution that ethical officials can make in achieving the goals of the detection process.

The detection capabilities of the AI technology, supplemented by follow-up interviews, has provided a rich understanding of the types and levels of corruption risk posed at specific tournaments and more generally within the sport. The findings of the AI testing, along with

¹⁹ This figure does not include 1 investigation currently awaiting approval.

²⁰ This figure includes one case undertaken by IBA but with MIIT support.

information obtained from a variety of other sources, has been input into a confidential and independently controlled database. This maintains and enhances the IBA's institutional memory and assists the decision-making process of senior IBA officials, both in terms of future policy making and when deciding upon the removal or monitoring of those officials who pose the greatest threat to fair competition.


The IBA has shown a commitment that the MIIT continue to carry out similar projects at future tournaments covering a wide range of IBA and Continental Federation events. The aim is to ensure that the positive steps already taken are maintained and enhanced so the sport does not regress to the darker days of AIBA when corruption amongst officials was prevalent as the norm rather than the exception.

5.6 Prevent Corruption in the Field of Play

Prevention of corruption in the FOP requires a multi-faceted approach which includes the protect and detect pillars detailed above. The statistical results demonstrate that the vetting process detailed above together with the presence of the MIIT at tournaments is having a prophylactic effect on the ability of corrupt officials to manipulate bouts. Indeed, the MIIT has been approached by several R&Js who have found the lifting of the chilling effect of the past as a result of the presence of the MIIT. Consequently, they feel more secure and protected thereby demonstrating the preventative impact of the presence of the MIIT and use of the AI tool.

A further measure that will prevent corruption in the FOP is the adoption of the recommendations of the MIIT outlining the treatment of an official being deemed high risk through the vetting process. This is necessary to ensure parity in the way high risk officials or any others who breach the Code of Conduct are treated. Rules need to be both fair and unambiguous, but at the same time send a strong message that unethical behaviour will no longer be tolerated and that preventative sanctions will be imposed on those who continue their involvement in these corrupt activities.

The IBA has made progress on a draft rule change related to officials that are determined to be high risk. The MIIT has reviewed this rule change and provided comments on how individuals assessed as high risk should be dealt with. These changes are being assessed as part of a wider series of preventative measures currently under review²¹. This rule change has yet to be approved by the Executive Board, however, and as things stand, the process for dealing with officials identified as high risk is either: not appoint them, or to remove them from competition, dependent on the stage in the vetting process at which the risk is identified. The process of assessing the integrity of officials is detailed in the following chart.



²¹ A redraft of the IBA Technical & Competition Rules (Rule 25 - Eligibility of Competition Officials) is currently being undertaken by IBA legal to incorporate vetting checks and provide for additional sanctions. It is understood that these amendments will be put before the Board for approval when they next meet at the end of June 2022.

Until this rule change is approved there is no policy currently in place between the IBA and the National Federations and Continental Confederations on how these individuals should be dealt with in the longer term. This means that the same high risk officials can continually apply or be put forward for selection to the next championship, at which time they go through the same vetting process. This inconsistency between the IBA, Confederations and National Federations has resulted in a situation where a previously deemed high risk official had been appointed to a tournament. The high risk official rule change would also enable those identified as being of significantly high risk to the reputation of the sport to be removed from the list of qualified officials for extended periods of time.

Robust and unambiguous policies will be the catalyst of further cultural change where corruption is no longer tolerated and those displaying these behaviours will be dealt with in a manner befitting their conduct. Following the adoption of the MIIT's recommendations to the rule on high risk officials, this will enable the sport to take more robust action against these officials thereby reducing the rate of recidivism. This should have the added benefit of sending out a positive message to ethical officials who can then feel even more confident reporting their concerns to trusted senior officials.

The collective impact of the MIIT's process in preventing and detecting high risk officials should also provide a renewed level of confidence for boxers and their teams that each bout is being fairly judged. Confidence in the abilities and ethical behaviour of officials would also likely reduce instances of contentious bouts. Close results would be seen as part and parcel of the subjective nature of judging this sport, rather than preordained manipulative behaviour, which has historically been the fallback viewpoint and the basis upon which many bout protests are submitted.

5.7 Improving the Disciplinary Process for IBA

Discussion in this area was set out in Stage 3. The topic is important and attention needs to be drawn to it in this Report. In addition, the comments here may not repeat what is said in Stage

3, nevertheless it is important to emphasize the following points. Historically, in cases where there were allegations of bout manipulation, the gathering of evidence to a standard required by the Ethics Committee in order to sanction an official has been notably difficult to achieve. There is a fine line between incompetence and deliberate manipulation, the latter being particularly hard to prove without strong supportive evidence. Allegations of bout manipulation undertaken directly by corrupt individuals or through pressure and/or intimidation on other officials have rarely concluded with anyone found having breached the Code of Conduct.

In the past, investigations were either not commenced at all or were not conducted in a suitable and timely fashion where events and the witnesses' recollections remained foremost in their minds. The investigations were less than complete and frequently not acted upon. Where cases were eventually submitted to the Disciplinary Committee ("DC"), they were dealt with in a lethargic manner. The common explanation was that there was a lack of necessary evidence to support the allegations, with the case summary usually suggesting it was one person's word against another, with no action taken by the DC. The typical finding would be that there was no breach of the Code of Conduct because of alleged insufficient evidence to meet the onus of proof. The consequence of these decisions generated the belief in corrupt officials that they could continue their activities with impunity. The counterpart to that proposition by ethical officials is that there would be little incentive to go to the DC as the outcomes rarely resulted in disciplinary sanction. The recommendations in Stage 3 provide the framework to change this problem.

The presence of the MIIT at problematic competitions, combined with support from IBA Counsel, demonstrates the value of immediate action onsite to gather and preserve evidence, thus allowing a more complete complaint to be filed with the DC. Therefore, the DC will be in a better position to weigh the evidence and determine rule violations. A more vigorous investigation process well presented to a robust DC should over time change the standoff above. There is an opportunity to reverse the balance of justice in favour of ethics and fair play.

5.8 Conclusion: Is Reform achievable?

The description of various issues and incidents in this chapter could lead one to believe that the process of true reform is still a considerable way off. That is not necessarily the case. During the year of investigation by the MIIT, there has been significant improvements through its urging and submissions to the IBA. The organisation has taken a positive stance to address the issues that have plagued it for so long and many of the recommendations previously made are in the process of or have been implemented. As a consequence of the changing governance reforms, there have been some delays in adopting and approving these new procedures.

What goes on within the ring of the FOP is at the very essence of the IBA. The MIIT recognised that the difficulty of linking individuals to possible bout manipulations was likely to never result in many cases. Therefore, the approach was to tighten the perimeter of the FOP and what goes on inside it. The vetting process of officials was completely lacking prior to its inaugural application by the MIIT at the 2021 Men's World Championships. The step to implement it was supported by the IBA. It has progressed to a point where virtually all officials considered for appointment to the IBA and Continental Confederation championships have gone through at least one part of the integrity screening process. On the recommendation of the MIIT, high risk individuals have been removed or prevented from officiating.

The presence of the MIIT at selected tournaments has also had a positive effect in reducing the opportunity for corrupt activity while simultaneously providing officials who act with integrity and ethics with a safe and secure environment to perform their role in FOP. Where acts of suspected corruption have been identified by the MIIT, they have been quickly dealt with and the findings reported to IBA senior management for action. Progress can be made. Since Belgrade, there has been steady improvement at the 16 other tournaments where the vetting, the AI tool or both were utilised. There have been limited incidents regarding corrupt officials that have been identified or reported.

Incidents identified as having occurred at major tournaments are almost exclusively centred on individuals attempting to circumvent the very rules put in place to protect their integrity and the FOP. This inchoate change of policies or procedures must be accompanied with a cultural shift in attitudes to be fully implemented. To break the long-standing cycle of indifference to the rules, a zero-tolerance policy for breaches of the rules needs to be adopted and proportionate sanctions imposed upon offenders. The procedures for dealing with high risk or corrupt officials needs to be unambiguous, robust and backed by well drafted rules. Some rule amendments suggested by the MIIT are currently awaiting approval by the IBA Board. Some identified issues require policy amendment; of particular importance is the IBA control of the accreditation process for attendance at tournaments.

The Codes of Conduct and Ethics apply not only to competition officials but also to all others directly connected to national and international events, including boxers, their teams and members of their respective Federations. Breaches of these Codes, especially where these involve intimidation or abuse of officials or attempts to circumvent the rules for their own nations benefit, should be treated in a similar manner and in the most serious cases referred to the IBA Ethics Committee for review.

The MIIT wishes to applaud officials who have exhibited stellar ethical conduct and have had the confidence to come forward voluntarily report corruption concerns. When that has occurred, the MIIT has investigated in a timely manner and where appropriate those intent on harming and corrupting the sport have been removed.

Highlighted in this chapter is the importance of the R&J draw and the manipulation of the same through manual amendments. With upgraded technology better suited for its purpose, reductions in the manual amendments to the draw can be achieved. The technology used should be consistent across all Confederation and international events, and manual amendments should be very rare, done only in the most extenuating circumstances and subject to independent scrutiny. With those changes, allegations of corruption can be eliminated.

For the sport to shed its tarnished image of the past, the governing bodies at all levels need to work together supporting each other for the common good. At the heart of the transformation of the IBA is the need for recognition of comprehensive training and high ethical standards combined with a sense of fair play.

Chapter 6: The IBA Family – The Role of Confederations and National Federations

6.1 Introduction

The fabric of the IBA family is made up from the 203 National Federations and 5 Continental Confederations. It is from this group of National Federations around the world from whence IBA officials are drawn. In order to better understand the relationship between the international governing body and its members, the MIIT developed and implemented a survey of IBA member Federations. This chapter reports on the highlights of the results and responses received and ties it into the other work of the MIIT. A full copy of the survey results will be made available to IBA following the public release of this Report. Only the highlights are discussed in this chapter.

6.2 The Confederations History

Up until the AIBA Extraordinary Congress held in October 2007, there were two organizations at the continental level: (i) The Continental Confederation; and (ii) The Continental Bureau (representative of AIBA on the continent).

As the co-existence of those two bodies was a source of potential conflict and held a unique status in the world of sport, a Reform Committee launched by AIBA in January 2007 recommended to only keep the Continental Confederation. This proposal was approved by the delegates of AIBA National Federations during the Extraordinary Congress by 103 votes in favour (3 abstentions and 1 vote against). However, as changes were due to take place only at the time of the 2010 elections, AIBA kept two Vice Presidents per continent (1st Vice President and 2nd Vice President) until 2010, apart from Oceania where there was only one.

The Confederations as they currently exist are the: African Boxing Confederation (AFBC); American Boxing Confederation (AMBC); Asian Boxing Confederation (ASBC); European Boxing Confederation (EUBC); and Oceania Boxing Confederation (OCBC).

Together, the Confederations serve and support 203 National Federations. Each Confederation President sits on the IBA Board of Directors. The GGRC has brought about changes in the governance structure. This chapter describes the structure up to the March 2022 changes to the constitutional structure of the governance process for the IBA, the renamed International Federation for Boxing.

6.2.1 List of AIBA Continental Presidents from 2006 to 2022

2006-2010 (Congress held in November 2006 in Santo Domingo, Dominican Rep.)

Africa	Abdallah Bessalem (Algeria) Joseph Ayeni (Nigeria)
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America	Jorge Guzmán (Cuba) Domingo Solano (Dominican Rep.)
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Jorge Guzmán resigned during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games for health reasons. Domingo Solano thus became the 1st Vice President and Osvaldo Bisbal (Argentina), who had the highest numbers of votes at the last elective Congress, was appointed as the 2nd Vice President.

Asia	Gafur Rakhimov (Uzbekistan) –appointed as AIBA Executive Vice President by Wu. Jianping Chang (China)
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Europe	Eduard Khusainov (Russia) Humbert Furgoni (France)
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Eduard Khusainov was suspended by the AIBA EC in February 2007 on the ground that he was allegedly the leader of a terrorist group, among other issues, and thus various court cases followed.

Humbert Furgoni became the 1st Vice President and Evgeny Murov (Russia) was appointed by Wu as the 2nd Vice President in 2009 (Evgeny Murov had been appointed as a member of the AIBA EC in 2007, who was the Chairman of the Boxing Federation of Russia Supervisory Board and the Head of Security of the Kremlin).

Oceania

Lohial Nuau (Papua New Guinea)

Lohial Nuau was suspended by the AIBA DC in June 2010 due to financial mismanagement. Upon a request by Wu, Keith Walker (New Zealand), who was appointed as member of the AIBA EC early 2009, acted as Executive Director of OSBC for several months until the 2010 AIBA Congress held in November 2010 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

2010 – 2014 (Congress held in November 2010 in Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Africa

Abdallah Bessalem (Algeria)

America

Domingo Solano (Dominican Republic)

Asia

Jianping Chang (China)

Europe Humbert Furgoni (France)

Humbert Furgoni was suspended by the AIBA DC due to his misconduct during and after the London 2012 Olympic Games. Franco Falcinelli (Italy) was appointed as his replacement in late 2012.

Oceania Keith Walker (New Zealand)

2014 – 2018 (Congress held in November 2014 in Jeju, Korea)

Africa Kelani Bayor (Togo)

Kelani Bayor was suspended by the AIBA DC in September 2017 due to his misconduct during the 2017 African Continental Championships. Clément Sossa Simawango (Gabon – brother-in-law of Kelani Bayor) was immediately appointed by President C.K. Wu as his replacement, but this appointment was cancelled by Franco Falcinelli (at the time Interim President of AIBA) and Mohamed Moustahsane (Morocco) was appointed on 19 October 2017 as replacement for Kelani Bayor (Clément Sossa Simawango had on numerous occasions violated the AIBA Statutes and was thus ineligible).

America Osvaldo Bisbal (Argentina)

Asia Serik Konakbayev (Kazakhstan)

Europe Franco Falcinelli (Italy)

Oceania Ted Tanner (Australia)

2018 – 2022 (Congress held in November 2018 in Moscow, Russia)

Africa Mohamed Moustahsane (Morocco)

America Osvaldo Bisbal (Argentina)

Osvaldo Bisbal resigned from his position in July 2021 due to health reasons and passed away in November 2021. AMBC elections took place on 30 September 2021. José “Chiqui” Laureano (Puerto Rico) was elected as the new AMBC President and thus became a Vice President of AIBA/IBA and presently is a member of its Board of Directors.

Asia Anas Al Otaiba (United Arab Emirates)

ASBC elections took place on 12 March 2022. Anas Al Otaiba decided not to stand for a 2nd term. Pichai Chunhavajira (Thailand) was elected as the new President of ASBC and thus became a Vice President of IBA and presently is a member of its Board of Directors.

Europe Franco Falcinelli (Italy), now Ioannis Filipattos

Oceania Ted Tanner (Australia), now Tauhiti Nena

OCBC elections took place on 12 February 2022. Ted Tanner decided not to stand for 3rd term. Tauhiti Nena (French Polynesia – NF which separated from French NF in 2010) was elected as the new President of OCBC and thus became a Vice President of IBA and presently is a member of its Board of Directors.

6.3 National Federation Relationship with Officials

Many problems within the AIBA related to officiating can be found in the recruitment and retention of officials by National Federations and sponsorship by confederations. Officials who meet the applicable standards are the lifeblood of international tournaments. However, questions arise as to how a small number of Federations continue to regard their officials as a way of influencing competitions to their benefit.

For an official, the perks of acquiescing to the will of the National Federation or their National Olympic Committee includes the opportunity to qualify for international status and travel overseas. For some, this opportunity comes at a price – their integrity. Some officials have been expected to support the aims of the Federation as their first priority. The MIIT reported on these behaviours in the Stage 1 Report and include pressure and bribes to influence officials selected to officiate a bout with the athlete from their country in their favour.

Following the debacle of Rio, pressure built for change and the behaviour of some National Federations was forced underground where leverage over their officials became more subtle. This was undertaken by way of pre-briefing before travelling or messaging across private systems such as WhatsApp or Telegram. This highlights a recommendation of the MIIT Stage 3 Report that proposed, as is done in other sports, the power to uplift data from mobile telephones and other digital media as an important part of evidence collection and deterrence.

This continued pressure on officials is not applicable to all National Federations. During interviews of current and former Continental Presidents, it was accepted that this was still however a difficult problem to resolve for some members. All Continental Confederations are alive to the problem and are determined to counter it with education and discipline.

The MIIT has worked hard at countering this impact over the past six months. Counter measures were undertaken through the use of an Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) integrity risk assessment program developed and implemented by the MIIT. A program of vetting officials due to serve at

the international level was introduced. It is evident from feedback that improper influence by some National Federations is an ongoing problem.

In order to corroborate and assess the extent of concern raised and to understand more the relationships between Federations, the Continental Confederations and the IBA, the MIIT conducted a survey of National Federations. The questions related to concerns over corruption and the transparency of the engagement with IBA and the Continental Confederations.

6.3.1 Survey Methodology

The survey was developed by the MIIT using a web-based platform called Qualtrics Experience Management. A total of 203 Member Federations were invited to participate in the survey through an introductory email sent out by the IBA on behalf of the MIIT. An initial invitation was sent on 5 April 2022 followed by reminder emails and the survey was officially closed on 28 April. A total of 109 responses were received, indicating a response rate of 54%. This is generally accepted to be an excellent response rate and is likely driven by high levels of motivation to complete the survey.

Surveys were completed by the President or General Secretary of the Federation. Member Federations were advised that responses would be kept confidential and results would not be tied back to individual responses that would identify the Member Federation.

For some questions, responses were grouped and analysed by Continental Federation in order to examine key themes, as well as similarities and differences that may be evident.

6.3.2 Discussion of Survey Findings

The survey found that more than 30% of Federations indicated some level of agreement with the following statement:

“Fixing the outcome of boxing matches is a problem in our Federation.”

This is further broken down by Continental Confederation regions including America (46% agreement with statement), Asia (43% agreement with statement), Africa (32% agreement with statement), Europe (20% agreement with statement) and Oceania (14% agreement with statement). As the IBA-implemented vetting program continues its impact, it will be interesting to re-evaluate this question in a year's time. However, even the perception of such a high level of corruption needs to be constantly addressed.

The perception of the problem was even more acute at the international level with more than 53% of Federations indicating some level of agreement with the following statement:

“Fixing the outcome of boxing matches is a problem in IBA competitions.”

When compared with the former statement, more Federations believe that match-fixing is a problem within IBA competitions generally (53%) versus being a problem within their own Federation (30%). It is a concerning finding that more than half of Federations consider match-fixing to be a problem in IBA competitions. The MIIT's current counter measures against corruption in all competitions will help drive this figure downwards. The number of integrity vetting checks and high risk exclusions illustrate the impact of these counter measures. It should be taken as a serious warning sign that there is no room for complacency in addressing this issue.

The questions asked in the survey examined more than just questions about corruption in the ring. More than 27% of Federations indicated some level of agreement with the following statement:

“Non-bout-related forms of corruption (e.g. elections) is a problem in our Federation.”

More than 27% of Federations indicated some level of agreement with this statement. When examined by Continental Federation, the highest level of concern about non-bout related forms of corruption is expressed by the Continental Federation of America (61% agreement with statement),

followed by Europe (46% agreement with statement), Africa (45% agreement with statement), Asia (31% agreement with statement) and Oceania (28% agreement with statement).

The MIIT also asked respondents if they believed non-bout-related forms of corruption is a problem in the IBA as compared to their own Federation (next statement below).

More than 44% of Federations indicated some level of agreement with the following statement:

“Non-bout related forms of corruption (e.g. elections) is a problem in the IBA.”

When compared with the previous statement, more Federations (44%) believe this is a problem in the IBA compared to being a problem in their own Federation (27%). The MIIT cautions that there could be response bias accounting for this difference.

It is encouraging, however, that the message does seem to be getting out about what to do if corruption is identified. This is reinforced through the MIIT vetting program. More than 70% of Federations indicated some level of agreement with the following statement:

“Our R&Js and ITOs understand how to report allegations of match-fixing.”

This is further broken down by Continental Confederation regions including America (77% agreement with statement), Asia (75% agreement with statement), Europe (73% agreement with statement), Africa (68% agreement with statement) and Oceania (43% agreement with statement). The results from Oceania are significantly lower than other Continental Federations which suggests that more training may be necessary to educate R&Js and ITOs on reporting procedures.

A large majority (82%) of Federation executives understand the process to report allegations of corruption. Results were similar across Continental Confederation regions (all above 80%) with the

exception of Oceania where 57% of Federations indicated that their executives understand the process to report allegations of corruption.

It is encouraging that almost 65% of Federations indicated some level of agreement with the following statement:

“The current amount of education provided by the IBA about corruption and match-fixing is adequate.”

This suggests that there is an opportunity to build on current programming to increase the amount of education provided by the IBA about corruption and match-fixing.

The next question set related to Member representation and interaction within the IBA structures. There appears to be strong support for voting relations at the Continental level. For example, 77% of Federations agree with the following statement:

“Our Federation is satisfied with the process of voting for representatives at the Continental level.”

The strongest level of overall agreement with this statement comes from Federations in Asia (100% agreement), followed by Europe (87%), America (77%), Oceania (57%) and Africa (55%).

Most Federations (71%) feel that the Continental Confederations have an appropriate amount of control over their Federation. While most of the Federations across Continents reported similar levels of agreement, only 36% of Federations in Africa feel that their Continental Confederation has an appropriate amount of control.

There is strong support (81%) for the Governance Reform Group’s recommendation to use the annual congresses to give National Federations more oversight of decisions at the international level.

This survey illustrates that there continues to be a perception of corruption at all levels. This is not unexpected given what has been reported by the MIIT over the course of its investigation. With the counter measures being implemented in an increasing number of tournaments the MIIT expects the perception of corruption to decrease over the coming year. However, these statistics serve as a useful foundation against which the impact of the counter measures can be assessed. It is therefore recommended that the survey be administered again within a year.

6.4 Risks to the Integrity of International Competitions and Recommendations for Change

6.4.1 Failure to Conduct Competitions in Accordance with Rules and Standards

The relationship that exists between the IBA, the Continental Confederations and National Federations is critical to ensure the integrity of the IBA and Continental tournaments. Consistent application of the rules and standards free from administrative errors and allegations of corruption and manipulation will reduce the negative perception of how the sport is managed at all levels.

Evidence obtained by the MIIT over the past 12 months and further supported by the survey results suggests that rules and standards at the international level are not as rigorously and consistently applied as thought to be the case. As a consequence, there is a lack of integrity in international tournaments from the ongoing threat of corruption and bout manipulation.

National Federations and Continental Confederations understandably operate in vastly different ways based on the needs of their athletes along with their ability and desire to provide education and training to their competition officials. While it would be unfair to generalise about national and continental organisations as a single group, it is evident from both the survey data received, and research conducted by the MIIT, that these interdependent bodies lack standardised performance because of the absence of centralised oversight. This potentially leaves the door open for abuse of the ethics codes by appointed competition officials.

6.4.2 Sharing of Information

It is vital to the integrity of all tournaments, but especially those at international level, that only ethical R&Js and ITOs are selected to officiate. This requires a transparent process of information sharing between the IBA, Confederations and National Federations to ensure that only those with the highest ethical standards reach senior positions. For far too long there has been a practice of tolerating unethical officials because of their competency levels and/or experience. Since commencing its vetting program, the MIIT has identified a number of these experienced and competent, yet unethical officials. Consequently, they have either been recommended for non-appointment to subsequent tournaments or reported for disciplinary action.

There needs to be a centralised corporate database where the IBA and Confederations can input and access information. The MIIT has created this with an independent database of intelligence provided to them and also taken from IBA sources. It is imperative that Confederations and Federations supply information related to misconduct and disciplinary cases to this central database. At Belgrade 2021, it was established that two judges that were listed to attend were under suspension by their respective National Federations. The National Federations never reported or recorded these suspensions with AIBA. This state of affairs was discovered through the MIIT's due diligence checks. AIBA and the LOC had no knowledge of these suspensions and they were prepared to have them officiate at AIBA's most important tournament. The due diligence report triggered their removal and brought about the creation and implementation of the centralised database administered by the MIIT.

6.5 The Selection Process of Officials

The selection process across the IBA and its Confederations lacks complete harmonisation. While it appears the situation is improving, there continues to be an absence of harmonisation and improvements in the selection process. The ad hoc selection process of officials at confederation tournaments as compared to the IBA's newly streamlined selection process increases the chances of corruption and manipulation at confederation level competition.

6.5.1 IBA R&J Selection Process

The selection process for competition officials for IBA-owned or -sanctioned events has recently been updated to incorporate the MIIT integrity screening process. The procedure complies with external direction and is in line with the IBA R&J/ITO best practice model regarding gender equality and confederation parity.

R&J appointments are made by the Task Force/Sub-Committee of six IBA R&J Committee members. The Task Force is composed of the five Confederation R&J Chairs and the IBA R&J Committee Chair as the Lead.

1. To be considered for officiating duties, R&J's must meet the required criteria of eligibility²², certification, performance and linguistic ability along with all other criteria in accordance with the IBA Technical and Competition Rulebook.
2. The list of proposed R&Js for each IBA tournament must also include the required gender and confederation balance.
3. Once these criteria have been met, a random draw then takes place to determine the list of selected candidates and reserves, with an IBA Committee Member present to ensure transparency.
4. The list of selected candidates is then sent to the MIIT for pre-competition integrity vetting checks. Upon successful conclusion of this first vetting process, R&Js are notified of their selection. If the opportunity is declined or unanswered within a given time period the next official on the reserve list is selected until all positions have been filled.

²² R&J is not currently under any suspension or investigation by IBA, a confederation or his/her respective national federation. R&J is not currently appointed to a board of director position for IBA, a confederation or a national federation.

6.5.2 IBA ITO Selection Process

5. A similar process is applied for ITO selection in terms of meeting the eligibility criteria as detailed at point 1 above, and to include participation in major events over the last 4 years.
6. A random draw is made in the presence of an observer from all eligible candidates, to include a reserve list. This includes the requirement to meet a gender and confederation balance. The random draw board meeting is recorded and provided to the IBA Sports Department and the IOC to ensure transparency and appropriate delivery of selection process.
7. The list is sent to the MIIT to conduct the integrity screening process in line with that detailed at point 4 above, after which the successful appointees are notified.
8. The IBA Secretary General (“SG”) is then informed of the final list of ITOs selected for appointment to the tournament.

6.5.3 Confederation R&J Selection Process

The process for the selection of competition officials for confederation tournaments varies from tournament to tournament and may not appear to fulfil set procedure or guidelines. Some Confederations apply a rule that when National Federations are notified of upcoming competitions, those which intend to send 3 or more boxers, must nominate and register a R&J as well. These nominations then go back to the Confederation for approval by its R&J Commission and subsequent checking against the IBA database for confirmation of meeting certification and eligibility criteria. It now appears that most Continental championships submit their lists of R&Js to the IBA which enables the integrity vetting process to take place, and those considered to be of unacceptable high risk to be removed prior to the commencement of the tournament.

6.5.4 Confederation ITO Selection Process

What is less clear is the process of ITO selection. The MIIT has attended tournaments where there has been no central vetting of ITO's conducted, which has led to either uncertified ITOs being appointed locally or not enough officials appointed to fulfil the roles required and to the standards expected for international competition. Both these issues have been raised by TDs in post-competition reports and are further reported later in this chapter. This decentralised system of both appointments and attendance payment can undoubtedly place additional pressure on competition officials to adhere to instructions to manipulate bouts, as for some, their very livelihood through future appointments depends on their compliance.

Prior to the MIIT commencing its vetting program of R&Js and ITOs in October 2021, no integrity screening was conducted before the final selection process. Officials would have been appointed solely based on the recommendations of their federations, subject only to demographic requirements to ensure some form of neutrality in the officiating process. This left the door open for unethical officials to be appointed to all major competitions where, should they choose, they would be free to corrupt bouts and intimidate their peers with little or no chance of being identified and removed.

A list of provisional appointees is now passed to the MIIT researchers who conduct searches in its database. Due diligence checks are now undertaken prior to confirmation for attendance. Any recommendations for non-appointment are sent to the relevant IBA committees for consideration. Further AI vetting procedures and interviews are now also conducted at selected tournaments to reinforce this process. AI risk assessment and investigations conducted by the MIIT over recent months have corroborated the belief that the influencing of bout results comes predominantly from certain groups of countries but by no means from all.

6.6 Notification of Sanctions and Investigations

It is vital that any imposed sanctions and/or ongoing investigations being conducted at national and/or confederation level are notified to the IBA for the selection process to work efficiently. This prevents individuals identified as having the potential to undermine the integrity of a tournament from officiating until their cases have been finalised and/or suspensions served. Since the MIIT database is only as good as the information contained therein, failure by the federations to advise of unethical behaviour could have serious integrity implications.

It appears that there are currently no agreed protocols or policies in place to ensure the notification of sanctions or investigations, but more an informal reliance on the federations to keep them informed. As an example, at a 2021 tournament, an official who was previously suspended by its National Federation was proposed and approved to officiate at an international competition in 2021. The MIIT pre-competition due diligence checks identified this R&J as having been suspended. This revealed that the IBA had not been informed of the suspension by the National Federation, and as a result, approved him to attend. It was only during the pre-competition checks by the MIIT that the suspension came to light. The official was removed prior to the tournament commencing. *It is recommended that a policy is introduced requiring all National and Continental Federations to report suspensions to IBA, active investigations and allegations of corruption where integrity of officials is or has been brought into question.*

6.7 How the Corruption Process Commences at NF Level

All federations want to be successful at competition, and especially when they act as host. This is mainly for the kudos it brings both at home and on the international stage, but also for the funding streams that many federations so desperately need from their respective governments or National Olympic Committees. Proper financing predominantly comes only with this success, so this can lead to a 'win at all costs' approach, leading to corruption of and by officials to ensure that bout results are manipulated to achieve the required outcomes. When hosting, there has been evidence that some federations have an expectation of entitlement to win a medal. This

legacy corruption issue has no place in the sport. A recently retired board member echoed that there *“can no longer be an expectation of a medal just for hosting.”*

The types of bout manipulation encountered by the MIIT and recommendations to counter this unethical behaviour have already been detailed in Chapter 5. In this chapter we are looking more at how these potentially corrupt individuals come to learn their trade and progress through the ranks unhindered by the very mechanisms that should prevent it.

The process by which an individual commences their journey as a boxing official starts at national federation level. It is here that they learn their trade by undertaking their initial training and certifications while also gaining experience through watching and learning from their more experienced colleagues. What they learn at this stage, both in terms of competence in their role but also of ethical behaviour, shapes their future career progression. If they see that corruption and manipulation are an acceptable part of the role they perform at this level, then it is likely that they will take this mentality with them as they progress up the certification levels to continental and full international officiating.

It is also evident from work conducted by the MIIT that officials who are part of certain federations are more susceptible than others to this type of pressure to corrupt, especially where their career progression and/or livelihood is dependent on their compliance. Once they have become integrated into the corrupt groups, it is then very hard to leave and they go through their careers believing that it is either an acceptable and necessary practice or that there is no avenue for escape. Hence, by the time they rise to the higher echelons of officiating, corruption has been ingrained in them and they have become, willingly or otherwise, masters of the art.

There have also been indications that some certified R&Js are funded by individuals who have influence over, but no direct connections, to any National or Continental Federation. These officials, especially those from lower income countries, are therefore highly susceptible to pressure to manipulate bouts as their very livelihood depends on them being compliant. This

usually takes the form of either direct manipulation within the FOP or through pressure and/or intimidation of others to do the same. If they fail to act as directed or if they are caught and suspended, they will simply be replaced by another official on the payroll and their financing will come to an end. They therefore have very strong motivations to do what is requested of them, irrespective of their personal, moral or ethical beliefs. One ITO who spoke with the MIIT said *“some of these countries in the continents and whatever, these guys are forced by their Federation's to be there to be stronger against some referees, and Judges”*.

Intimidation by corrupt officials towards their international colleagues to score bouts in favour of specific nations is probably the most common technique encountered by MIIT investigators when speaking with ethical R&Js who have been subject to their approaches. A senior tournament official recently told MIIT investigators that *“through my experience in competition, in this role is when countries are allowed to send referees, they try to send a strong personality referee who becomes a threat to other referees.”* It is generally considered that they are the ones most likely to succeed at influencing the scoring behaviour of new and less experienced but otherwise ethical officials. This theory has been corroborated by a significant number of officials when discussing their experiences of this type of intimidating behaviour. One ITO discussed the feeling of relief when the MIIT recommended and achieved the removal of certain high risk R&Js from a 2021 competition. He stated, *“So now suddenly, people were talking. And it's not quite the same now. You can feel it, the relief. People believe in it, and they're not afraid to say anything, and talk to each other.... Before. You were afraid to say something, because you would never know if it was the wrong person.”*

6.8 The Change in Manipulation Strategies

Following restrictions imposed on the use of senior federation members as technical officials, their methodologies to influence the outcome of bouts has moved from direct action on or around the FOP to a more underground or behind the scenes form of manipulation. This usually relies on advanced instructions being given, which are then carried out by R&Js who are within the corrupt circles, either by prior agreement on what the outcome will be or more likely through

use of signalling techniques which enable decisions to be made and adapted during the course of a bout.

Officials from certain National Federations created cliques based on similar language and/or other geographical alliances in which each will support the other in their manipulative activities in order to achieve a common goal. Techniques of signalling and other forms of bout manipulation, as detailed in the previous chapter, have been identified or suspected by the MIIT during its investigative work. However, identifying such activity is not an easy task, as those involved continue to adapt their methodologies in order to stay one step ahead of those whose role it is to prevent corruption. When discussing these issues with an IBA official, he replied *“I think it's a big thing for the continents, because I think that's where the problems begin. And then these guys come up through the ranks into the bigger picture, and then it's a problem for everybody”*.

6.9 Failures in the Reporting Process and Follow-up Action

That is not to say that these activities always go undetected. Strong senior officials in the form of Technical Delegates, Deputy TD's, observers and evaluators regularly identify suspect officials and have them removed from the FOP. These issues are or should be reported in the TD's end of competition report along with any recommendations for further action. However, it has become clear that certain less than ethical, perhaps incompetent or even plain lazy senior officials do not report such activities, reducing the likelihood of any remedial action being taken. As an example, during a recent in-competition investigation conducted by the MIIT which involved the removal of an official for alleged bout manipulation, this particular incident was not mentioned at all in the end of competition report.

MIIT investigators have spoken with a number of senior officials who state that the value of the end of competition report is often undermined, as little or no action is taken at national or confederation level on any reported incidents involving alleged corruption. Additionally, the current reporting template focuses predominantly on issues relating to the administration of the

event, like transport, accommodation and other organisational matters, with no requirement to highlight areas of concern relating to those operating on the FOP. It is therefore very much up to the discretion of the TD as to whether incidents of this nature are ever reported.

Certain TDs are not always impartial and might, for example, not wish to highlight the unethical behaviour of someone attached to their own national federation or of those where other allegiances exist. The same could be said at confederation level where allegations of corruption by officials linked to them would not present the federation in a good light, so it is often easier to ignore the findings of any report and carry on as if nothing has happened.

For Confederation Championships, TD reports which, if completed properly, would be a significant tool in the fight against corruption are currently only sent to the Local Organising Committee (“LOC”) and the respective confederation. There is no requirement to send a copy of the report to the IBA to enhance the corporate memory. If this did occur, it would ensure that those officials who habitually breach the Code of Conduct could be dealt with centrally through the proscribed disciplinary processes. This lack of coordination has the deliberate or otherwise effect of enabling allegedly unethical or incompetent officials, who have been removed from one tournament, to apply and be successfully appointed to the next. One judge is quoted as saying *“So that when referees or judges are removed from the competition, if something was to happen, that we don't see them in the next competition, this has been the problem for a number of years.... So these guys were allowed to come again, to give somebody else the problem and causes another competition problem. For me, that's probably one of the biggest problems.”* As previously discussed in Chapter 5, it is recommended for TD’s Report template to be updated and all reports to be sent to IBA for logging (by MIIT).

6.10 Training and Education Variations

Training and education of officials both in terms of competence and ethical values are key to reducing some of the risks to fair competition which have been identified in and around the FOP. The results from the anonymous federation survey conducted by the MIIT indicates that while

many say they follow the technical rules and training guidelines of the IBA for both R&Js and ITOs, the way in which they are administered can vary considerably from country to country and continent to continent.

Some survey responses indicated that training and evaluation were conducted regularly on a quarterly basis by qualified officials, while others stated that it was done annually at best. Additionally, while the training was sometimes undertaken by certified IBA officials, these were not specifically qualified trainers. At the extreme end, one confederation stated that they had not had any training for R&Js for over 10 years. Some federations used online training materials while others had to send their officials to other countries to undertake courses. A number of federations stated that their training was restricted due to language difficulties and/or financial constraints. ITO training was a particular issue with some counties having received no training for this group.

The above survey responses clearly show the disparity in education and training for officials that exists across the spectrum of the federations and acts as a bar to enabling certain countries' officials to have the opportunity to progress their careers at international level. Consequently, within some federations, only those fortunate enough to have achieved the required levels of certification (in some cases through favouritism or nepotism) are eligible for appointment at international and confederation level. This reduced pool of available officials is likely to be the reason why the same individuals are proposed for appointment to international competitions time and time again, irrespective of their competence and ethical values. The survey results indicate that in some stated cases, these officials will likely be the same people who, when they return home, conduct the training and assessments of new recruits at national federation level. Therefore, if they are the subject of allegations of bad behaviour and/or incompetence they will be instilling these poor qualities and unethical values on those attempting to rise through the ranks, thus continuing the cycle.

6.11 Requirement for Centralised Education Program

As a consequence of the MIIT's work, it is clear that a more standardised form of training and education is required across National Federations and that opportunities should be available to all. One federation's survey response stated *"No ITO training has ever been officially organised in our country. In short, with your support we would like to train"*.

Training programs should ideally be coordinated through a central training department under the administration of the IBA, where only certified and proven instructors are used. While language and finance are a potential obstacle to this, technology now exists to enable at least the theory part of this educational process to be conducted remotely and in different languages. Those showing potential could then be invited to specific events or localised training camps where more practical sessions could be undertaken. Attendees would be evaluated and where appropriate, placed within a development program.

A fresh approach to education, both in terms of ensuring competence and a good ethical outlook, would be a significant starting point for the creation of a new pool of officials, untarnished by those whose history is mired in corruption and incompetence.

This program would also have an impact on the selection process of R&Js and ITOs for international competitions. The survey responses again showed varying methodologies perhaps indicating that some did not fully understand how their selection procedures operated in practice. Some respondents stated that officials were selected by the IBA or the Confederation while others said it was undertaken by the LOC. Some federations said their favoured officials were put forward based on performance, knowledge and language ability, while others said decisions were made by the NF executive committee or randomly selected. This ad hoc process which appears to exist in some federations leaves the door open for the deliberate selection of officials based on national self-interest rather than individual merit or the good of boxing in general. One competition official involved in the R&J certification process supported this view when stating *"I have passed so many young individuals in all the strong countries Russia was*

there, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan everywhere. And when we go to the competition when they're allowed to send their own referee of judge, it's the same referee, another guy who has been around a long time, you know, and this is the problem for me, I would like to see all the young referees come and make mistakes, but it's levelling mistakes".

The adoption of a centralised process for training, certification and appointment of officials at confederation level championships and above can only be a positive step towards ensuring that accurate officiating and fair play remains at the forefront of the sporting ideals. *The creation of a training academy for officials controlled and administered centrally by IBA is recommended.*

6.12 Risks from LOC Failures

The organisational capabilities of the LOC are the mainstay of any successful competition. If one or more parts of their responsibilities fail it can have a knock-on effect throughout the rest of the tournament. In addition to arranging a suitable venue and making it fit for purpose, they are also responsible for all other aspects of event management, including accommodation, transportation, venue security, doping control procedures, accreditation provisions, media requirements and automated technologies for ensuring the athlete and officials draws, along with the scoring systems and timings are accurate and beyond reproach. These are no easy tasks to perform and require significant coordination between all those concerned to ensure a successful championship.

It is fair to say that the majority of these LOC-organised events run smoothly with little or no issues arising that could have been prevented. However, from the MIIT's attendance at various events along with speaking to others involved in the organisational process, it is clear that the organisation of some tournaments leaves much to be desired. Examples identified include:

- Inappropriate venues for the level of championships;
- Boxing rings not properly constructed leading to safety issues and competition delays;
- Inefficient transportation of officials to the venue;

- Hotels for athletes too remote requiring the weigh-in procedures to be changed;
- Poor segregation of officials from others attending the venue;
- Substandard anti-doping controls;
- Security protocols not fully enforced; and
- Accreditation procedures not properly administered.

When viewed in isolation, these may not appear as significant issues. However, when multiplied, they can have a serious impact on the smooth running of a competition and allow critics more ammunition to attack the organisational foundations of the sport. All the above are avoidable with proper planning, preparation and coordination.

The staffing of R&Js and ITOs of some federation events also appears to be an ad hoc process. The appointment of the required number of certified R&Js usually, but not always, proceeds without issue, as a tournament cannot continue without this element being sufficiently staffed. However, at a recent tournament, only 21 R&Js were provided by the Confederation to cover two rings. A generally accepted number is 36, when taking neutrality rules and R&J wellbeing into account. At this particular tournament, the TD wanted to stand two R&Js down for suspected signalling but could only do this one at a time as otherwise the competition could not have continued.

Within one Confederation, it has been decided that those nations who bring three or more boxers with them but do not supply the requisite number of officials have to pay the Confederation to enable them to find neutral R&Js from other countries. Although these payments are made, it appears that the money is kept by the Confederation and not used for the purposes for which it was intended.

ITO staffing appear to be even more of an issue at some Confederation level events and two recent tournaments attended by the MIIT highlighted this issue. At one event, not only was the ITO requirement not met in terms of numbers, but those appointed by the LOC/Confederation were not fully certified in the roles they undertook. Only the TD was fully certified, which placed

an immense and unnecessary strain on that official to maintain control of bouts being undertaken simultaneously in two rings. As detailed in Chapter 5, this led to issues arising that could likely have been prevented if detected earlier. The TD's end of competition report recommendation for future tournaments was to have *"at least one IBA Ringside Doctor and 2 IBA certified RJ Evaluators and 2 IBA Deputy TDs. With ranking points for OG qualifications this would be very important"*.

At another event, even though the officials were fully certified, there were simply not enough of them to efficiently undertake the roles required of them. There were only two evaluators who were also running a course simultaneously and there was no observer. There should ideally have been four evaluators to cover two rings and at least one observer.

Although some have responded to these criticisms by saying that lower-grade continental competitions do not require the same levels of staffing as major ones, boxers train hard for every event they attend and deserve to have the officialdom in place to ensure that any international competition they attend runs smoothly and that results are based on merit through fair and competent officiating. It is therefore vital that standards are raised to ensure that acceptable minimum standards are reached and maintained across all aspects of international competition organisation and control.

6.13 Conclusion

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the issues and concerns mentioned above do not apply to all National Federations, the majority of whom who are extremely ethical in their outlook and want to achieve standards that befit the hard work put in by boxers of all nations on a daily basis in order to achieve their sporting goals. A few, however, do not achieve the expected standards and this has an adverse impact on the whole boxing family.

One of the main issues identified is the lack of parity in standards applied to confederation tournaments as opposed to IBA sponsored events. This includes both organisational requirements as well as that pertaining to the education and selection of officials.

The relationship between the IBA and the Continental and National Federations is necessarily one of interdependence and trust. They all need each other in order for the adopted systems and procedures to work effectively. Without strong relationships and coordination, the current attempts at reform will surely be stifled and allow those intent on destabilisation through corrupt practices to ultimately succeed.

Chapter 7: Recommendations

This Chapter consolidates all of the MIIT's recommendations found throughout the Reports from each of the 3 investigation Stages. This Chapter commences with the MIIT's recommendations previously announced in the Stage 3 Report based upon the investigative work of Stages 1 and 3. The reader will recall that the Stage 3 investigation and Report was done before the current Stage 2 final investigation and Report because of the way events in the sport unfolded following MGSS' and its partner Harod's commencement of the Stage 1 investigation process. The work of the Stages was not sequential.

The Recommendations arising from the final Stage 2 investigation by the MIIT are described under general topic headings as was done with the Stage 3 recommendations. There inevitably is some overlap mainly to reinforce important points of reform.

P A R T I RECOMMENDATIONS PUBLISHED IN STAGE 3 REPORT (10 DEC. 2021)

RECOMMENDATION ONE: INDEPENDENT INTEGRITY UNIT

The MIIT supports and reinforces by this investigation the recommendation the Governance Reform Group led by Professor Haas which recommended the formation of an Independent Integrity Unit. The MIIT's investigation has revealed the historical lack of trust not only between AIBA management and its R&J stakeholders, but within and between R&Js themselves. The emergence of authoritarian factions of language-based cliques have raised fears among the R&Js that noncompliance with their requests to score bouts based on pre-determined results would run a double risk of retaliation from both management and the internal cliques. Therefore, it is imperative that AIBA staff, volunteers, R&Js, ITOs and members have access to a safe, secure and independent office to raise their concerns and complaints. The following are more specific recommendations to aid in the formation of the Independent Integrity Unit.

- i. Independent Integrity Unit (“IIU”) to have its own staff and budget under the control of a Chief Integrity Officer.
- ii. IIU to be the single point of contact to receive complaints, investigate and where required refer to Disciplinary Committee (“DC”). Where IIU provides the evidence it has to DC, it will prosecute the referral case.
- iii. IIU to investigate complaints and where appropriate send case to Disciplinary Committee (“DC”).
- iv. IIU to have a separate position dedicated to prosecution of matters before the Disciplinary Committee (“DC”).
- v. IIU to vet all R&Js and ITOs proposing to attend AIBA level competitions. Vetting process to include:
 - a. IIU vetting conducted pre-arrival to competition;
 - b. Administration of on-site Challenger Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) integrity risk screening of individual officials;
 - c. Follow up interviews post AI analysis; and,
 - d. Report to Secretary General (“SG”) & R&J Chair on persons assessed to be high-risk (SG makes final decision on continued participation).
- vi. IIU on site at AIBA level competitions to perform an independent observer role over the FOP and the actions and role of R&Js, ITOs, their committee chairs, the Draw Commissioner, Technical Delegate, and Bout Evaluator.
- vii. Independent Observer Report to be given by IIU to the AIBA President and Secretary General.
- viii. IIU to provide an on-site investigation service with right to zero tolerance for breaches of rules and procedures of the FOP.
- ix. All of the above recommendations should be applied to Confederation level Championships.
- x. IIU to vet candidates for elected positions with recommendations to the Nominating Committee for those not meeting eligibility requirements to run for election.
- xi. IIU to vet all new hires for AIBA senior staff in consideration for an appointment with report to human resources or the Secretary General.
- xii. All permanent staff who voluntarily or involuntarily leave AIBA to have an exit interview with the IIU.

- xiii. IIU in charge of the stored institutional memory and intelligence information gathered in its own secured database in the course of the operation of the IIU.
- xiv. IIU to provide an oversight role in reviewing and recommending changes to the Anti-Doping control procedures.
- xv. IIU to provide an oversight role on match-fixing for gambling related reasons.
- xvi. A combined International, National and Confederation Task Force be called to determine if a complaint and investigation process similar to what is being recommend for AIBA is suitable to apply at the Confederation and National levels below AIBA.
- xvii. IIU to evaluate the strength and credibility of information received.

RECOMMENDATION TWO: WHISTLEBLOWER

AIBA currently operates a Whistleblower line, which is not used arguably because of lack of trust of the organisation. The MIIT recommends that the Whistleblower line be moved to the control of the IIU. Until very recently, with the inaugural year of the temporary Integrity Officer, there was not a centralised office where AIBA stakeholders could report complaints. Some individuals complained to AIBA staff who would do nothing with the complaint or make an assessment of evidence and then still refrain from taking action. Others went to the Disciplinary Committee (“DC”) who had no budget or investigative capacity.

The DC had no authority to compel compliance with their queries. If individuals the DC requested to interview refused to cooperate or if they provided no information then the DC dismissed the complaint for insufficient evidence often stating the burden of proof was not met. Moreover, there was no official process that would be followed when a complaint was received. However, the MIIT noticed a lifting of tension and distress while it was on-site during the AIBA World Boxing Championships at Belgrade and several officials thanked the MIIT for being available to make confidential disclosures. The following are the specific recommendations in relation to the establishment of a trusted and effective Whistleblower line.

- i. Whistleblower hotline to be independently maintained and managed by the IIU to build confidence and trust and to ensure confidentiality.
- ii. IIU to evaluate the strength and credibility of information received.
- iii. Whistleblower protection policy to be reviewed and revised in accordance with these recommendations.
- iv. A recognised position on the Board to champion whistleblowers demonstrating a top-down interest in whistleblowing. Also to ensure that whistleblowers are protected from retaliation.

RECOMMENDATION THREE: INTEGRITY OF AIBA INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

The MIIT recommends independent background vetting by IIU of all elected positions, competition officials and senior staff new hires. The process by which this would be done, utilising risk analysis techniques which measure voice responses to automated questions, was tested and found to be successful at the World Boxing Championships at Belgrade earlier this year. The MIIT recommends the following additional measures to complement the artificial intelligence process.

Specific to elected positions:

- i. No one to be elected and re-elected for more than two full terms.
- ii. Consider age limitation on elected officials at age 80 (as per the IOC standard).
- iii. AIBA elected officials cannot enter the FOP, meaning they also cannot hold an ITO position because the position requires presence on the FOP.
- iv. Executive Committee Members cannot have a role paid or unpaid, with any company sponsoring AIBA.

Applied to all positions:

- v. Full disclosure of outside business interests and a ban on links to sponsorship companies or any organisation presenting a conflict with their role at AIBA. This to be applied to elected and appointed officials and staff.

- vi. Establishment of a gift register for elected competition officials and members of staff to be reviewed by the IIU.
- vii. Gift Policy to be reviewed and revised in accordance with these recommendations.
- viii. Enable mobile phones/ electronic devices and laptops to be copied by the AIBA IIU should it be required in the course of an investigation.²³
- ix. Maintain an intelligence database of all incidents and disciplinary actions to ensure ongoing corporate memory of any problem. This extends beyond the officials to those who seek to influence them in anyway.
- x. Be proactive in screening for integrity threats to officials and take pre-emptive action.

RECOMMENDATION FOUR: EDUCATION

The MIIT recommends that AIBA develop an integrity education program. This would include consistent communication to officials of the integrity processes and requirements described in these recommendations. Of key importance is to develop a communication and educational strategy which is deployed prior to the start of each competition, reviewing what is and is not acceptable behaviour. For example, the MIIT found evidence of alliances between officials from countries speaking the same language supporting each other in bout manipulation. Education should cover:

- i. Meaning of the zero tolerance policy and consequences of its violation.
- ii. What is deemed a bribe and how to deal with offers.
- iii. Explain what actions they should take if they receive unsolicited messages from outside people or through electronic means to influence an event.
- iv. Explain how the integrity measures are designed to help them protect themselves.
- v. Explain the use of the Whistleblower line and how to report to the IIU.

²³ At Belgrade the MIIT had examples of improper messages being circulated and capturing this in evidence is important part of any disciplinary process.

- vi. Explain the functions of the IIU.
- vii. One half of the Executive Committee Board Members to be required to attend recognised corporate governance training session every second year. Failure to attend results in a suspension until attendance is confirmed.
- viii. R&Js, ITOs and other personnel on the FOP to have bi-annual integrity training sessions. To retain their status they must successfully pass any tests administered during or at the end of the training.
- ix. Assist competition officials in understanding the measures needed to protect themselves from outside or internal illicit influence.
- x. Bout review training to be undertaken annually for R&J evaluators and independent observers.
- xi. Review and revise the exam administration process and procedures and consider it in the course of developing the curriculum. Particular attention to be paid to the administration of testing and the evaluation of the test results to stop the cheating.

RECOMMENDATION FIVE: DISCIPLINARY PROCESS

Only a limited number of disciplinary cases have been launched and dealt with between 2014 and the present. This stunning paucity of cases during this time despite the complaints heard reveals that the disciplinary process is in dire need of an overhaul. The MIIT accepts that, in part, justification for this was that there was no budget, investigative capacity or capabilities. Investigations amounted to asking questions by email and accepting at face value the response given; then concluding that there was insufficient evidence or that burden of proof had not been met resulting in the complaint being dismissed. There was also a perceived lack of appetite to pursue any investigation by management who received complaints and then did nothing with the information. The MIIT recommends:

- i. The IIU provides the increased investigation and prosecution capacity.

- ii. Review and revise the Codes of Conduct and Ethics policies to capture the breaches of the unacceptable behaviours described in this Report and make breaches easier to investigate, prosecute and sanction.
- iii. Disciplinary actions to be clearly defined and enforced.
- iv. Review and revise the Code of Conduct to enable to the capture of intelligence and evidence from electronic storage and digital communication devices.
- v. IIU to have the ability to independently launch an investigation without a complaint and based on the intelligence gathered in the course of its operations.
- vi. IIU to have a separate office to prosecute cases before the DC.
- vii. Introduction of clear structure of sanctions alongside increased tariffs for second offences.
- viii. Any ban to be strictly enforced. No contact whatsoever to be allowed with a banned individual. Contact with a banned person to be made an offence.

RECOMMENDATION SIX: RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT OF ROLES OF INDIVIDUALS IN FOP

The judging of bouts in boxing is one of the most subjective assessments made in any Olympic sport. Judging in boxing is without objective criteria other than a boxer being unable to continue the bout because of knock out, or TKO. In such an environment, where most of the corrupt manoeuvring is undertaken surreptitiously, catching someone red handed while in the process of cheating or conspiring to manipulate a bout is virtually impossible to achieve. That being the case, the only method of control and oversight is by rigorous enforcement of the FOP rules and the activities in which they can engage while in the FOP. Some officials at Belgrade did not conform with the rules and perhaps lacked full understanding thereof to carry out the roles they were assigned. Protection against bout manipulation is best achieved in a sport that is very subjective in its judging by rigorous enforcement of their role. The MIIT recommends:

- i. Greater education for officials to understand their role and FOP rules is required.

- ii. Discipline should follow from any breaches of the FOP rules without exception.
- iii. No mobile phones or other form of digital communication allowed on the FOP by competition officials unless specific need for contact related to the competition.
- iv. Rigorous application of the principle of neutrality to R&J Evaluators.
- v. Officials' lounges must be secure and access by unauthorised personnel or visitors prohibited.
- vi. Immediate investigation of offences reported and zero tolerance applied to breaches.
- vii. Measures to be applied at International, Continental and Youth Championships.

P A R T II RECOMMENDATIONS FROM STAGE 2 REPORT (20 JUNE 2022)

Now that the investigation of all 3 Stages is completed the MIIT has, with the benefit of hindsight of the past year, a better overall perspective on the IBA and what is required. As the investigation work moved forward in the various stages, the MIIT noticed that it was becoming more of a consultant to the sport than an investigator thereof. The transition point was the use of the vetting and AI tool at the Belgrade Men's World Championships in October/November of 2021. The use of the AI tool and the work at Belgrade was of an investigator nature to isolate potential corrupt R&Js and ITOs with a view to their renewal. However, at the request of the sport, the future use of the AI tool in the Women's World Championships in Istanbul in May 2022 and other competitions thereafter made the MIIT realise that what was emerging were the pillars of reform described in Chapter 5 of this Stage 2 Report. Now, the MIIT was less an investigation body and more a consultative body assisting the sport.

The recommendations of Stage 2 can be segregated into overarching recommendations directed at reform of the IBA itself and how it operates. They are set out at the beginning of the list below. After these recommendations are described the balance of the recommendations of Stage 2 tie back to the broad-based Headings of the Stage 3 recommendations. That being the case, the headings of the Stage 3 recommendations is utilised to group further particular Stage 2

recommendations that relate to the same broad topic Heading. Each of these recommendations can be found in the body of the Stage 2 Report.

RECCOMENDATIONS ON IBA REFORMS

- i. Board of Directors should institute a cultural review study using the MIIT investigation reports describing the pathway to cultural reform. The reform needs to focus on the National Federations and the relationship to the continental confederations. The review of the member National Federations needs to determine incentives to encourage past learned behaviour to be revised in accordance with MIIT investigation and reports.
- ii. Board of Directors to undertake a study and revision of all IBA policies relating to Codes of Conduct and Ethics, Safe Sport and Athlete Protection and Anti-Doping. The purpose would be to build a firm foundation for the new behaviour and actions of individuals of the sport.
- iii. Board of Directors to seek funding to establish a Training Academy whose purpose would be to train R&Js, ITOs and senior management of the IBA and National Federations. That training should include instruction on ethical decision making, match-fixing and rule compliance for R&Js and ITOs. For senior management it would involve leadership development and occupational skill development.
- iv. The IBA develop a centralised, comprehensive written training and educational programs for the certification and subsequent progression of R&Js and ITOs. The revised educational programs to be staffed by trained instructors with accompanying certifications of achievements in the progression of R&Js and ITOs. All of the education to be controlled and developed by IBA to be made available as the basis from which all National Federations conduct their education and training.
- v. The office administration and sport management by the staff of the IBA needs improvement in responding to rule changes or amendments. Proper management practices are required in respect of the maintenance and storage of operational material of any kind. The physical storage area of IBA offices needs a complete redesign and cataloging of important corporate information.

- vi. There needs to be a centralised corporate database where IBA and Continental Confederations can input and access information. Maintenance and continued development of the database establishing the electronic corporate memory created and established by the MIIT. The database created and used exclusively by the MIIT can form part of a new corporate database. The Board of Directors needs to decide who in addition to the IIU to have access to the database or parts thereof.
- vii. The accreditation process for access to IBA and Continental Confederation level competitions be removed from the Local Organising Committee and the President's office and be centralised and controlled by the IBA staff. A vetting process to be coordinated with and administered by the Independent Integrity Unit (IIU) to be conducted prior to issuing accreditation where required.
- viii. Control of the selection of officials in the R&J pool for Continental Confederation level and National level competitions should be removed from NF and Continental Confederations' responsibility and placed in the control of the IBA.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE RIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT IN FOP

These recommendations are in addition to those in recommendation 6 in part 1 of this Chapter.

It is recommended that:

- i. For the protection of all those involved and for the prevention of potential manipulation, an additional level of independent oversight is introduced to the draw process. This would ensure that a single individual, even as the senior technical official, would not be able to dictate manual amendments made to the automated draw, without full justification and approval.
- ii. Technology needs to be upgraded and made fit for purpose with advanced filters in order to reduce allegations of corruption. Technology must be consistent across all confederations and international events, with manual amendments only undertaken in the most extenuating circumstances and subject to independent scrutiny.
- iii. All manual amendments should be closely and independently scrutinised to avoid allegations of draw manipulation. It is recommended that automated systems with the

full range of filters be adopted for use in all senior tournaments at Continental Confederation level and above, so that instances of manual amendments become a rarity rather than a regular occurrence.

To complete the recommendation two other steps need to be completed

- a) If necessary, password protected access can be installed to ensure that pre-set neutrality filters cannot be changed without independent oversight. When manual amendments are required, the reasons should be documented, scrutinised and signed off at an appropriate level by someone independent of the process.
 - b) System operators need to be professional, ethical, competent and properly trained.
-
- iv. Penalties commensurate with the breaches be imposed on those who continue to disregard the rules [regarding the use of mobile phone in the FOP].
 - v. All cases involving the abuse of officials, no matter in what capacity, should be reported to the IBA Integrity Office for investigation and review, and dealt with in the same manner as any other Code violation, irrespective of the position held by the alleged abuser.

RECCOMENDATION INTEGRITY OF INTERNAL IBA STAKEHOLDERS

- i. It is a recommendation of the MIIT that the end of competition report format be redesigned to put greater onus on TDs to fully assess the actions of officials and incidents about which concerns have been raised. There should be no retaliation for full, plain, frank and complete disclosure. The fear of such retaliation has been a problem in the past.
- ii. It is recommended that a copy of all TD reports at Continental Confederation and National Federation level of competition should be sent to the IBA sports department for review, input into the database and taking action where appropriate, to ensure that allegations of repeat offending are identified and can be dealt with in the future. TD's Report template to be updated and all reports to be sent to IBA for logging.
- iii. Anyone sanctioned or under active investigation by a Continent Confederation is notified to the IBA as a matter of policy, in order that database records are updated to have a true reflection of current status of any certified official.

- iv. That a policy is introduced requiring all National and Continental Confederations to report to the IBA suspensions, active investigations and allegations of corruption where integrity of officials is or has been brought into question. All information to be recorded in a consolidated database recommended above.
- v. The MIIT has reviewed this rule change and provided comments on how individuals assessed as high risk should be dealt with. These changes are being assessed as part of a wider series of preventative measures currently under review²⁴.

²⁴ A redraft of the IBA Technical & Competition Rules (Rule 25 - Eligibility of Competition Officials) is currently being undertaken by IBA legal, to incorporate vetting checks and provide for additional sanctions. It is understood that these amendments will be put before the board for approval when they next meet at the end of June 2022.